Showing posts with label Consumer Protection. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Consumer Protection. Show all posts

Monday, September 23, 2013

Pay Day Loans for Military Families

  • Annual percentage rate capped at 36 percent: Because most payday loans are for several hundred dollars and have finance charges of $15 or $20 for each $100 borrowed, a typical two-week term can equate to an annual percentage rate (APR) ranging from 391 percent to 521 percent. Payday lenders must cap the APR – which incorporates all fees and costs associated with the loan – at 36 percent when lending to servicemembers.
  • No rolling over of loans: When consumers cannot pay back the loan at the time it is due, borrowers can often pay only the finance charges and renew the loan. This fee does not reduce the amount owed. If a payday loan is rolled over multiple times, it’s possible to pay several hundred dollars in fees and still owe the original amount borrowed. Payday lenders are banned from rolling over loans for servicemembers, unless the new transaction results in more favorable terms for the servicemember.
  • No signing away of servicemember rights: The MLA prohibits lenders from making servicemembers waive their rights under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act or other state or federal laws that provide critical consumer protections. The MLA also prohibits lenders from requiring servicemembers to waive their right to seek resolution of any legal claims in court.

  • No requiring allotments to repay: Under the military allotment system, military personnel can repay their loans by having payments directly deducted from their paycheck before their salary is deposited in their account. When servicemembers pay by allotment, they lose certain consumer protections as well as their flexibility to adjust their budget if a financial emergency comes up. The MLA bans lenders from requiring military members to pay by the allotment system and gives servicemembers control over how their income is spent.
  • http://considerchapter13.org/2013/09/22/cfpb-lays-out-guidelines-for-protecting-servicemembers-in-the-payday-lending-market-cfpb-watching-for-military-lending-act-violations-in-its-exams-of-payday-lenders/?utm_source=Sept%2023%20email&utm_campaign=9%2F23%2F13&utm_medium=email

CHASE TO PAY $309 MILLION REFUND FOR ILLEGAL CREDIT CARD PRACTICES

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ordered Chase Bank USA, N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. to refund an estimated $309 million to more than 2.1 million customers for illegal credit card practices. This enforcement action is the result of work started by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which the CFPB joined last year. The agencies found that Chase engaged in unfair billing practices for certain credit card “add-on products” by charging consumers for credit monitoring services that they did not receive.

http://considerchapter13.org/2013/09/22/cfpb-orders-chase-and-jpmorgan-chase-to-pay-309-million-refund-for-illegal-credit-card-practices-approx-2-1-million-consumers-receive-full-refund/?utm_source=Sept%2023%20email&utm_campaign=9%2F23%2F13&utm_medium=email

Monday, September 16, 2013

Pay Day Loans Can Charge up t0 500%

Western Sky Financial, owned by a tribal member of the Cheyenne River Sioux — has just announced that it will stop financing loans next month after numerous states have challenged their lending practices. 

Fifteen states have banned usurious payday lending to protect workers from the servitude of compound interest fees worthy of loan sharks. In reaction, lenders are now looking for other ways to ply their abusive trade — by conducting business offshore via the Internet or through ties with American Indian groups invoking their sovereign nation status. 

Western Sky Financial’s retreat is a significant step forward in the government crackdown on payday lending. The company faces usury law challenges in five states, most recently in New York where Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed suit this month charging the company with levying interest rates of more than 300 percent in violation of state law that caps interest at 25 percent. New York authorities have ordered 34 other online and American Indian lenders to stop providing online payday loans in the state, prompting American Indian groups to begin lawsuits in the name of their sovereignty. Complaints of abuses by Western Sky Financial are being pressed by authorities in Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota and Oregon as officials focus on lenders’ increasing resort to the Internet. 

Borrowers averaged 10 payday loans a year and paid $458 in fees. Firm standards and controls can rein in the abuses of payday lending. 

Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau recently announced an online sign-up portal for companies to receive complaints submitted to the CFPB regarding the company.

The online sign-up portal is accessible here:


The CFPB states: 
Every day, consumers submit complaints to us. Companies can respond to those complaints using a secure website. Sign up to start reviewing and responding to any complaints we have about your company.  After you sign up, we’ll call your point of contact for more detailed information and make sure you have the information you need to respond effectively to your complaints.

The CFPB describes the complaint and response process here:


Wednesday, September 14, 2011

9th Cir Allows Oregon UDCPA Claim Based on Failure to Respond Under FCBA, Actual Damages Under FCBA w/o Detrimental Reliance, Multiple Penalties for Multiple FCBA

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a creditor violated the federal Fair Credit Billing Act ("FCBA"), and Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act ("UDCPA"), when it reported a debt as delinquent to credit agencies and continued its collection activities without first providing an explanation to the debtor who had contested the debt.

According to the Ninth Circuit:  (1) these alleged actions by the creditor violated the Oregon UDCPA, based on the alleged violation of the FCBA;
(2) the debtor was entitled to actual damages and attorney fees under the FCBA, regardless of whether the debtor demonstrated detrimental reliance on the representations made by the creditor; (3) TILA's limitation of a single recovery for multiple failures to disclose does not necessarily apply to the FCBA; and  (4) the trial court failed to properly apportion an attorneys fee award as to the debtor's successful claims.

A copy of the opinion is available at:


This case arose from a misunderstanding regarding a $645 charge on the credit-card bill of the debtor.  The creditor allegedly misidentified the basis for the charge but then allegedly failed to respond to the debtor's requests for information about it. The creditor allegedly continued to seek payment and reported the debt as delinquent to credit agencies, despite the debtor's alleged protest.

In doing so, the Ninth Circuit noted that creditor admittedly violated the federal Fair Credit Billing Act ("FCBA").  After unsuccessfully attempting to get a direct response from the creditor, the debtor filed an action in the District of Oregon, alleging inter alia claims under the FCBA and Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act ("UDCPA").

The trial court dismissed the UDCPA claim and limited the debtor's total recovery under the FCBA to $1000.  The Ninth Circuit reversed.

According to the Ninth Circuit, if a credit card holder sends a written notice disputing a charge within sixty days of receiving a bill, FCBA requires a credit-card issuer to acknowledge the dispute within thirty days, investigate the matter, and provide a written explanation of its decision within ninety days.  If a creditor fails these requirements, it is subject to civil liability and forfeiture of the disputed amount.

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held, the Oregon UDCPA prohibits a debt collector from "[a]ttempt[ing] to or threaten[ing] to enforce a right or remedy with knowledge or reason to know that the right or remedy does not exist."

Examining the above statutes, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in holding that the debtor failed to state a claim under the Oregon UDCPA.  The Court reasoned, that pursuant to the requirements imposed under the FCBA, the creditor did not have the right to attempt to collect the disputed charge or to report it to credit agencies as delinquent without first providing a written explanation.  These allegations, the Court held, also violated the Oregon UDCPA.

The Court also rejected that a detrimental reliance component was required for the debtor's Oregon UDCPA allegations, reasoning that there was simply no relevant disclosure or conduct under these circumstances that the debtor could have relied upon.  Thus, the debtor's lack of detrimental reliance was immaterial to a determination of whether the creditor's violations resulted in actual damages.  Debtors, explained the Court, cannot rely on unmade explanations.  Otherwise, creditors could simply avoid actual damages under FCBA by never responding to billing disputes.

Next, the Court determined that the creditor's collection actions and adverse credit reports were not subject to the single-recovery limitation under 15 U.S.C. 1640(g).  Further, the Court also concluded that the debtor was entitled to all reasonable attorney fees, including those incurred for the appeal, related to the debtor's FCBA claims.

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

The FDIC Offers Tips on Preparing Financially For a Natural Disaster or a Fire

Hurricane Irene, the earthquake that shook the East Coast and the deadly tornado that hit Joplin, Missouri are recent reminders that disasters rarely give advance warning and can happen anytime. The Summer 2011 issue of FDIC Consumer News features tips on how to prepare financially for a natural disaster, a fire or another tragedy, especially one that requires people to evacuate their home and not return for days or weeks. Other timely topics in the latest issue include what to know before signing up for person-to-person, or “P2P,” electronic payment services using a smartphone or mobile computer; how to solve mysteries of old bank accounts; and an update on new standards for and disclosures by mortgage loan professionals.




The latest issue can be read or printed online at www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/news/cnsum11.

Friday, August 12, 2011

Thursday, April 14, 2011

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and National Association of Attorneys General Presidential Initiative Working Group Release Joint Statement of Principles

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1134.aspx

Consumer Bureau, State Attorneys General Partnership Will Help Better Protect American Consumers of Financial Products and Services from Unlawful Acts and Practices

WASHINGTON-The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Presidential Initiative Working Group of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) today announced agreement on a Joint Statement of Principles, the first step in forging a new partnership between federal and state officials to protect consumers of financial products and services.

Elizabeth Warren, Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury on the CFPB, highlighted the agreement in her remarks at the NAAG Presidential Initiative Summit today in Charlotte, NC.

"I anticipate that our cooperation will have a profound effect on the consumer financial markets," Warren told state attorneys general and others gathered at the summit, according to her prepared remarks. "Together, we can pose a greater deterrent to unscrupulous financial services providers. We can protect more consumers, and we can ensure that more institutions follow the rules."

"People are hurt every day by unfair financial products," said North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper, who serves as President of the NAAG. "This agreement will put more cops on the beat to protect consumers and businesses that are doing the right thing."

The Joint Statement of Principles was developed to advance three goals shared by the CFPB and state attorneys general to ensure protections for consumers of financial products and services: protect consumers of financial products or services from unlawful acts or practices; provide clear rules that improve the marketplace for consumers and remove unfair competition for the benefit of law-abiding businesses; and find ways to promote understanding and address concerns raised by consumers about financial products or services as efficiently and effectively as possible.

In the Joint Statement, the parties agree to:



• Develop joint training programs and share information about developments in federal consumer financial law and state consumer protection laws that apply to consumer financial products or services;

• Share information, data, and analysis about conduct and practices in the markets for consumer financial products or services to inform enforcement policies and priorities;

• Engage in regular consultation to identify mutual enforcement priorities that will ensure effective and consistent enforcement of the laws that protect consumers of financial products or services;

• Support each other, to the fullest extent permitted by law as warranted by the circumstances, in the enforcement of the laws that protect consumers of financial products or services, including by joint or coordinated investigations of wrongdoing and coordinated enforcement actions;

• Pursue legal remedies to foster transparency, competition, and fairness in the markets for consumer financial products or services across state lines and without regard to corporate forms or charter choice for those providers who compete directly with one another in the same markets;

• Develop a consistent and enduring framework to share investigatory information and to coordinate enforcement activities to the extent practicable and consistent with governing law;

• Share, refer, and route complaints and consumer complaint information between the CFPB and the state attorneys general;

• Analyze and leverage the input they receive from consumers and the public in order to advance their mutual goal of protecting consumers of financial products or services; and

• Create and support technologies to enable data sharing and procedures that will support complaint cooperation.

3rd Cir Upholds Dismissal of FDCPA and Other Allegations Relating to Time-Barred Debt

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that a debt collector did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., when the debt collector sent a collection letter to the debtor after the debt had become unenforceable due to the state’s applicable statute of limitations.


A copy of the opinion can be found at: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/102532p.pdf


Plaintiff-Debtor (“Debtor”) incurred credit card debt in 2001 owed to Defendant Applied Card Bank (“ACB”). The debt obligation was sold to a third-party, which retained Defendant Asset Management Professionals (“AMP”) to collect the debt. In 2009, AMP sent a letter to Debtor indicating that the Debtor’s account had been reassigned, requesting that the Debtor “resolve the issue,” and informing the debtor that the letter was an attempt to collect a debt.

Debtor brought suit against ACB and AMP alleging violations of among other things, the FDCPA and the FCRA, for the attempted collection of a debt which had become unenforceable under the state’s applicable statute of limitations. ACB and AMP filed a motion to dismiss, which the lower court granted. The lower court reasoned “that expiration of the statute of limitations makes a debt unenforceable, but does not extinguish the debt itself, such that neither” the assignment nor the attempt to collect the debt “violated the law or breached any duty.”

The Third Circuit affirmed, first holding that “under New Jersey law, Debtor’s debt obligation is not extinguished by the expiration of the statute of limitations, even though the debt is ultimately unenforceable in a court of law.” “In other words, Debtor still owes the debt – it is not extinguished as a matter of law – but he has a complete legal defense against having to pay it.”

The Third Circuit next held that the debt collector did not violate the FDCPA. The Court reasoned that “when the expiration of the statute of limitations does not invalidate a debt, but merely renders it unenforceable, the FDCPA permits a debt collector to seek voluntary repayment of the time-barred debt so long as the debt collector does not initiate or threaten legal action in connection with its debt collection efforts.” In addition, whether a “debt collector’s communications threaten litigation in a manner that violates the FDCPA depends on the language of the letter, which ‘should be analyzed from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.’”

In this case, “even the least sophisticated consumer would not understand AMP’s letter to explicitly or implicitly threaten litigation.” Moreover, “it would be unfair if debt collectors were found to violate the FDCPA both if they include the mandated language (because inclusion would threaten suit) and if they do not (because failure to include a mandatory notice violates the statute).”

The Court also held that the creditors did not violate the FCRA. The Debtor alleged that AMP obtained Debtor’s credit report from a credit reporting agency “without any FCRA-sanctioned purpose” in violation of Section 1681b of the FCRA. However, the FCRA “expressly permits distribution of a consumer report to an entity that ‘intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer.’” In this case, it “was that consumer transaction which ultimately resulted in AMP’s accessing of Debtor’s credit report to collect on his delinquent accounts,” which is an authorized use of consumer information under the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3)(A).

Finally, the Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Debtor’s complaints under RICO, the state consumer fraud act and the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. In essence, the Court found no reason why AMP’s “attempts to collect on a time-barred debtor or ACB’s transfer of that debt to a third party violates RICO or breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing.” In addition, the Debtor’s state consumer fraud claim failed because his complaint is “not based on AMP or ACB’s marketing or sale of merchandise or services to the Debtor.”

Identity Theft in Bankruptcy

Debtors in Pretension


by Magdalena Reyes Bordeaux

"Identity theft in the bankruptcy courts is a growing crime that often leaves unsuspecting consumers facing devastating consequences. Currently, when someone files for bankruptcy, there are no identification procedures at the time of filing to verify that the name on the petition is in fact the name of the person filing for bankruptcy relief. Accordingly, it is relatively simple for an identity thief to file a bankruptcy petition using a stolen identity. However, a victim of identity theft in a bankruptcy proceeding can clear up a tarnished record by filing a motion to expunge a fraudulent bankruptcy."

http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol27No6/2059.pdf

Thursday, March 24, 2011

Product Safety

The new searchable product-safety database operated by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), http://www.saferproducts.gov/, became fully operational on March 11, 2011. What will be its impact? Will it help consumers make informed decisions in purchasing safe toys for their children? Will it help regulators and manufacturers identify potentially dangerous trends before they otherwise might have been noticed? Will it be misused by plaintiffs' attorneys and experts as a means of "proving" the occurrence of incidents or injuries that never happened?

Product Safety

The new searchable product-safety database operated by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), http://www.saferproducts.gov/, became fully operational on March 11, 2011. What will be its impact? Will it help consumers make informed decisions in purchasing safe toys for their children? Will it help regulators and manufacturers identify potentially dangerous trends before they otherwise might have been noticed? Will it be misused by plaintiffs' attorneys and experts as a means of "proving" the occurrence of incidents or injuries that never happened?

Wednesday, March 16, 2011

ATM Fees Heading Higher

Some of the nation's biggest banks are imposing a variety of new fees on people who withdraw money from automated-teller machines, the Wall Street Journal reported today. JPMorgan Chase & Co., TD Bank Financial Group, and PNC Financial Services Group are already changing their ATM policies to collect more fees. JPMorgan's Chase retail division, for example, is going after noncustomers who withdraw money from the bank's ATMs. Chase executives have grumbled about customers of rival banks using the company's machines even though it charges them $3, which is standard in the banking industry. Chase is now testing fees of $5 and $4 in Illinois and Texas, respectively, for noncustomer withdrawals.

Monday, February 14, 2011

Ill App Ct Answers Certified Questions re: Assignments of Consumer Debts

The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, recently held that a collection agency has standing to sue, where the agency pleads and proves that it has legal title to accounts receivable assigned "for collection purposes only." The Court also held that an agency may establish such an assignment through multiple incorporated documents attached as exhibits to the complaint. However, the documents provided must include contracts of assignment or incorporate such contracts by reference; the agency may not rely merely on affidavits to establish an assignment. Further, the documents provided must also identify the accounts transferred, the consideration paid, and the effective date of the transfer of the accounts.


A copy of the opinion is available online at: http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2011/1stDistrict/February/1100855.pdf


Defendant borrower defaulted on a Citibank credit card account. Citibank then sold the account to Unifund Portfolio A, L.L.C. On the same day, Portfolio A sold the account to Cliffs Portfolio Acquisition I. Cliffs Portfolio then assigned its legal interest in the account to Palisades Collection, L.L.C., to enable Palisades to collect on the account, but purported to retain an equitable interest in the debt itself. Finally, Palisades then assigned its interest in the account to the collection agency plaintiff.

In support of its complaint, the collection agency plaintiff provided an affidavit of an employee who had reviewed plaintiff’s internal records, as well as various contracts of sale and assignment for defendant's account, along with other incorporated agreements. The defendant debtor moved to dismiss, arguing that the purported assignments of his account were inadequate under section 8b of the Collection Agency Act because required information, such as the account information, the consideration paid, and the effective date of assignment were scattered among plaintiff’s exhibits, rather than contained in a single document.

The Appellate Court first considered whether an assignee of a debt has standing to sue where legal title was assigned “for collection purposes only.” The Court examined Section 2-403 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which states “[t]he assignee and owner of a non-negotiable chose in action may sue thereon in his or her own name.” Because a chose in action is a “proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owed by another person,” the Court ruled, “[c]hoses in action like plaintiff's debt in this case are assignable.”

The Court further noted that “[a]lthough Illinois cases have not explicitly addressed this issue, long-standing modern practice in other jurisdictions allows the owner of a debt to transfer the entire chose in action outright to a third party, retaining no ownership interest in it, or to transfer only the owner's legal interest in the action, retaining an equitable or beneficial interest.”

The Court also examined Section 8b of the Illinois Collection Agency Act, which states that “[a]n account may be assigned to a collection agency…to enable collection of the account in the agency's name as assignee for the creditor.” Thus, the Court ruled, “[w]hen the two statutes are read together, it is apparent that an assignee for collection has standing to bring suit in its own name in order to collect a debt” and that “section 2-403 encompasses not only assignees who take complete ownership of an account but also those who merely take legal title for the purpose of collecting the debt while the creditor retains the beneficial interest and equitable title.”

The Court then considered the requirements for pleading assignment of a debt under Section 8b of the Collection Agency Act. Observing that a collection agency can bring suit to collect on a debtor's account only when “[t]he assignment is manifested by a written agreement, separate from and in addition to any document intended for the purpose of listing a debt with a collection agency,” the Court considered whether an assignment must be manifested by only a single document or must consist of multiple incorporated documents.

In analyzing this question, the Court noted that “the key phrases in Section 8b are ‘assignment manifested by a written agreement’ and ‘document manifesting the assignment’” and thus that “assignment of the account must be manifested by a legal document in the formal sense, that is, by a written contract of assignment… that is completely separate from any contract to list the account with the collection agency.”

Further because “[i]t is a fundamental principal of contract law that ‘an instrument may incorporate all or part of another instrument by reference’,” then “it follows that the terms of the assignment may be found in either the contract of assignment itself or in any other document incorporated by reference.” Thus, the Court ruled, “assignment under Section 8b can be established through multiple documents that are incorporated by reference into the contract of assignment.”

Having concluded that an assignment can be manifested by multiple incorporated documents, the Court then considered the content required for those documents to satisfy Section 8b, which “requires that the contract of assignment ‘specifically state and include’ both the effective date of the assignment and the consideration given for the assignment.” Further, the Court ruled, “[i]mplicit in the statute is a third requirement that the contract of assignment specifically state the relevant identifying information for the account that is being assigned.”

Although the plaintiff collection agency provided “three broad categories” of documents in support of their complaint, including “affidavits, contracts of assignment, and incorporated documents,” the Court ruled that “[p]laintiff's use of the affidavit in support of its claim…is problematic,” because the “plain language of [Section 8b] provides only a single method of proving the existence of an assignment, and this method does not include affidavits.” The Court further noted that “[l]imiting the methods of proof of an assignment to only written contracts furthers…legislative policy because it requires collection agencies to clearly demonstrate that they and they alone are the proper parties for a debtor to be dealing with regarding their debt.”

Therefore, the Court ruled, bare “affidavits…cannot be used by a collection agency to prove the assignment and state a claim to a debtor's account.”

The Court then examined the contracts of assignment and incorporated documents provided in support of the plaintiff’s collection agency’s complaint. Although it declined to rule on their sufficiency, noting that “it is for the circuit court to determine whether all of the documents that plaintiff has attached to its complaint in this case satisfy the requirements of section 8b,“ the Court specifically noted that “Section 8b requires each contract of assignment in the chain of title for the account, beginning with the original creditor and ending with the plaintiff, to specifically state and include the effective date of assignment, the consideration paid, and the identifying information for the account transferred.”

Monday, November 29, 2010

WA Sup Ct Upholds Ruling Protecting Lender Files Obtained by AG from Release to Consumer Attorney

The Supreme Court for the State of Washington recently affirmed a Court of Appeals decision holding that federal privacy laws apply to a request for information brought by a consumer lawyer under Washington's State Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW, as to documents received by the state attorney general during an investigation of Ameriquest.


A copy of the opinion is available online at: http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/826901.opn.pdf

This case concerns documents obtained by the Washington State Office of the Attorney General from Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Ameriquest) during an investigation of Ameriquest's lending practices. These documents included loan files, e-mails, and "other papers." The AG received other information from consumers who filed complaints against Ameriquest, and also generated their own documents in relation to the investigation.

Melissa A. Huelsman (Huelsman), a "member of the public", made a request for records from the investigation referencing the PRA. The AG intended to disclose some of the information collected, but Ameriquest objected to the release of any information received from Ameriquest itself. The issue before the Supreme Court is "whether, and to what extent the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) . . . and the relevant Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rule" either preempt the PRA or otherwise prevent the AG from disclosing the information it received directly from Ameriquest.

The Washington Supreme Court described the GLBA as intended to protect customers' privacy, and to "protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal information." Under the rule-making authority contained in the GLBA, the FTC adopted the "Privacy of Consumer Financial Information." These federal regulations prohibit a "financial institution" from releasing a consumer's "nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party", unless the consumer is given the chance to opt out of such release by receiving prior notice. Relevant exceptions to this notice and disclosure requirement include when the release is done "with the consent or at the direction of the consumer", or to "comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation." The Court also noted that the federal regulations prevent a nonaffiliated third party from re-using or re-releasing any protected information received from a financial institution, and the nonaffiliated third party can share nonpublic personal information so received to its affiliates, but cannot share this information to a nonaffiliated third party unless the financial institution in question could lawfully do so.

Huelsman, an attorney representing former customers of Ameriquest, placed a request for documents which contained borrowers' "names, addresses, and loan terms and costs" but not other information such as their social security numbers. Ameriquest objected to such disclosure specifically in relation to Ameriquest's customer loan files, internal customer complaint files, employee e-mails, trade secrets and proprietary information, and the AG generated documents. The trial court denied Ameriquest's motion, while leaving in place a temporary restraining order, finding that the GLBA did not preempt state laws governing public disclosure of documents. The Appellate Court reversed this decision, holding that if the PRA conflicted with GLBA concerning disclosure, then the GLBA preempted the PRA and prohibited such disclosure. The Appellate Court held that as the AG is a nonaffiliated third party under GLBA, and Huelsman is not an affiliate of the AG, the GLBA therefore prohibited the AG's contemplated disclosure to Huelsman.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's ruling. The Appellate Court had remanded the case to the trial court stating, "[w]hat information in loan customers' files is public is a factual question that the trial court will need to address." The Supreme Court held that GLBA and FTC restrictions apply to the AG's proposed release of "nonpublic personal information to Huelsman." Information which meets the definition of "personally identifiable financial information", is non-public and may not be disclosed, regardless of the form it comes in, i.e.; loan files, emails, etc.

The Supreme Court further held that "the circumstances of the case" dictated that names, cases, addresses, and phone numbers of Ameriquest customers fit this definition as they were not only "personal identifiers", but would also disclose that the person in question "is or has been Ameriquest's customer." The Court further held that "[a]ny information" that constitutes "'nonpublic personal information' cannot be recast as publicly available information by the AG."

Finally, the Court held that only "aggregate information or blind data" that does not contain "personal identifiers" is exempt from the federal nondisclosure rules. The Court held that both the GLBA and FTC do not allow the AG to "newly redact or repackage the information" it already has to transform it into "blind data." Such data can only be disclosed if it is already in a "blind" or identifier-free state as delivered to the AG.