Rep. Spencer Bachus, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, announced this week that he has scheduled a subcommittee hearing and full committee markup of four bills that will terminate what he says are "failed and ineffective housing foreclosure programs." On the chopping block are the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), HUD's Neighborhood Stabilization Program, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Short Refi Program, and the Emergency Homeowner Relief Fund passed under the Dodd-Frank Act.
http://www.dsnews.com/articles/four-federal-foreclosure-prevention-programs-on-chopping-block-2011-02-24
Friday, February 25, 2011
FRB Issues Final Rule on Escrow Accounts for Certain First-Lien Jumbo Mortgage Loans, Additional Proposed Escrow Account Rule
The Federal Reserve Board issued a final rule revising the escrow account requirements for certain first-lien jumbo mortgage loans, implementing provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act's amendments to the Truth in Lending Act.
The final rule is available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20110223b2.pdf
The final rule implements a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act that increases the annual percentage rate threshold used to determine whether a mortgage lender is required to establish an escrow account for property taxes and insurance for first-lien, jumbo mortgage loans.
As you may recall, in July 2008, the FRB issued final rules requiring creditors to establish escrow accounts for first-lien higher-priced mortgage loans. A first-lien mortgage is considered a higher-priced mortgage loan if its APR is 1.5 percentage points or more above the current average prime offer rate. Under the final rule being issued today, the escrow requirement will apply to first-lien jumbo loans only if the loan's APR is 2.5 percentage points or more above the average prime offer rate. The APR threshold for non-jumbo loans remains unchanged.
The final rule is effective for covered loans for which the creditor receives an application on or after April 1, 2011.
The FRB also requested public comment on a second proposed rule to implement certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to TILA that would lengthen the minimum period for mandatory escrow accounts for first-lien, higher-priced mortgage loans from one to five years, and longer under certain circumstances such as when the loan is delinquent or in default.
The proposed rule is available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20110223b1.pdf
The proposal also would implement new disclosure requirements of the amendments. Disclosures would be required at least three business days before consummation of a mortgage loan to explain, as applicable, how the escrow account works or the effects of not having an escrow account if one is not being established. The proposed rule also would require consumers to receive disclosures three days before an escrow account is closed.
The proposed rule also would exempt certain loans from the statute’s escrow requirement. The primary exemption would apply to mortgage loans extended by creditors that operate predominantly in rural or underserved areas, originate a limited number of mortgage loans, and do not maintain escrow accounts for any mortgage loans they service.
The Board is soliciting comment on the proposed rule for 60 days after publication in the Federal Register, which is expected shortly.
The final rule is available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20110223b2.pdf
The final rule implements a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act that increases the annual percentage rate threshold used to determine whether a mortgage lender is required to establish an escrow account for property taxes and insurance for first-lien, jumbo mortgage loans.
As you may recall, in July 2008, the FRB issued final rules requiring creditors to establish escrow accounts for first-lien higher-priced mortgage loans. A first-lien mortgage is considered a higher-priced mortgage loan if its APR is 1.5 percentage points or more above the current average prime offer rate. Under the final rule being issued today, the escrow requirement will apply to first-lien jumbo loans only if the loan's APR is 2.5 percentage points or more above the average prime offer rate. The APR threshold for non-jumbo loans remains unchanged.
The final rule is effective for covered loans for which the creditor receives an application on or after April 1, 2011.
The FRB also requested public comment on a second proposed rule to implement certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to TILA that would lengthen the minimum period for mandatory escrow accounts for first-lien, higher-priced mortgage loans from one to five years, and longer under certain circumstances such as when the loan is delinquent or in default.
The proposed rule is available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20110223b1.pdf
The proposal also would implement new disclosure requirements of the amendments. Disclosures would be required at least three business days before consummation of a mortgage loan to explain, as applicable, how the escrow account works or the effects of not having an escrow account if one is not being established. The proposed rule also would require consumers to receive disclosures three days before an escrow account is closed.
The proposed rule also would exempt certain loans from the statute’s escrow requirement. The primary exemption would apply to mortgage loans extended by creditors that operate predominantly in rural or underserved areas, originate a limited number of mortgage loans, and do not maintain escrow accounts for any mortgage loans they service.
The Board is soliciting comment on the proposed rule for 60 days after publication in the Federal Register, which is expected shortly.
Cal App Ct Upholds Dismissal of MERS Challenge
A borrower obtained a loan in the amount of $331,000 from a lender to finance the purchase of real estate. In connection with that transaction, he executed a promissory note (the “Note”), which was secured by a deed of trust. The deed of trust identified the lender, as well as naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as beneficiary.
After the borrower defaulted on his loan payments, he was mailed a notice of default and election to sell, which initiated a non-judicial foreclosure process. The notice of default was sent to borrower by ReconTrust, which identified itself as an agent for MERS. Accompanying the notice of default was a declaration signed by an employee of Countrywide, which was acting as the loan servicer.
The borrower then filed a lawsuit against Countrywide, MERS and ReconTrust, attempting to allege a number of different causes of action. The only causes of action at issue on the appeal were the first and second causes of action.
The borrower’s first cause of action was titled “Wrongful Initiation of Foreclosure” and alleged that “the person or entity who directed the initiation of the foreclosure process, whether through an agent of MERS or otherwise, was neither the Note's rightful owner nor acting with the rightful owner's authority.” In other words, the first cause of action asserted that MERS did not have authority to initiate the foreclosure because it was not authorized to do so by the current owner of the Note.
The borrower’s second cause of action sought declaratory relief on the issue of whether California “[Civil Code section 2924, subdivision (a)] allows a borrower, before his or her property is sold, to bring a civil action in order to test whether the person electing to sell the property is, or is duly authorized to so by, the owner of a beneficial interest in it.” The court noted that although designated a cause of action for declaratory relief, the second cause of action served simply as a legal argument in support of the first cause of action. The defendants filed a demurrer as to the first and second causes of action, which the trial court sustained without leave to amend.
In sustaining the ruling of the trial court, the appellate court first noted that California’s non-judicial foreclosure scheme is set forth in California Civil Code sections 2924 through 2924k, which “provide a comprehensive framework for the regulation of a non-judicial foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale contained in a deed of trust.” The court noted that “[t]he purposes of [the] comprehensive scheme are threefold: (1) to provide the creditor/beneficiary with a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor; (2) to protect the debtor/trustor from wrongful loss of the property; and (3) to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.” Finally, the court stated that
“[b]ecause of the exhaustive nature of this scheme, California appellate courts have refused to read any additional requirements into the non-judicial foreclosure statute.”
With the purpose of California’s comprehensive non-judicial foreclosure scheme in mind, the court ruled that the borrower was “attempting to interject the courts into” the scheme without pointing to any legal authority to do so. The borrower argued that such authority was provided by Civil Code section 2924, subdivision (a). The court rejected the argument noting that Section 2924, subdivision (a)(1) states that a “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents” may initiate the foreclosure process. The court further ruled that “nowhere does the statute provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure process is indeed authorized, and we see no ground for implying such an action.”
The court then discussed three federal district court cases, which the borrower cited as purported legal authority for the alleged right to challenge an entity’s ability to initiate the foreclosure process. The court found that the cases were not controlling, nor were they on point, as none recognized “a cause of action requiring the noteholder's nominee to prove its authority to initiate a foreclosure proceeding.” Further, the court noted that “the district court cases from outside of California are inapposite because they do not apply California non-judicial foreclosure law.”
Finally, the borrower argued that even if California's non-judicial foreclosure law did not provide for the filing of a lawsuit to determine whether MERS had been authorized by the holder of the Note to initiate a foreclosure, the court should nevertheless interpret such a right as the “[l]egislature may not have contemplated or had time to fully respond to the present situation.” Again, the court rejected this argument, finding that “because California's non-judicial foreclosure statute is unambiguously silent on any right to bring the type of action identified by [the borrower], there is no basis for the courts to create such a right.” The court therefore held that “the trial court properly sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the first and second causes of action in [the borrower’s] complaint.”
In addition, the appellate court went on to hold that “[a]s an independent ground for affirming the order sustaining the demurrer. . . even if there was a legal basis for an action to determine whether MERS has authority to initiate a foreclosure proceeding, the deed of trust. . . establishes as a factual matter that [borrower’s] claims lack merit.” The court noted that the language of the deed expressly stated MERS had the authority to initiate a foreclosure.
Finally, the court held that the borrower would not be able to cure the defects of his complaint simply by amending the allegations. The court therefore held that “the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.”
After the borrower defaulted on his loan payments, he was mailed a notice of default and election to sell, which initiated a non-judicial foreclosure process. The notice of default was sent to borrower by ReconTrust, which identified itself as an agent for MERS. Accompanying the notice of default was a declaration signed by an employee of Countrywide, which was acting as the loan servicer.
The borrower then filed a lawsuit against Countrywide, MERS and ReconTrust, attempting to allege a number of different causes of action. The only causes of action at issue on the appeal were the first and second causes of action.
The borrower’s first cause of action was titled “Wrongful Initiation of Foreclosure” and alleged that “the person or entity who directed the initiation of the foreclosure process, whether through an agent of MERS or otherwise, was neither the Note's rightful owner nor acting with the rightful owner's authority.” In other words, the first cause of action asserted that MERS did not have authority to initiate the foreclosure because it was not authorized to do so by the current owner of the Note.
The borrower’s second cause of action sought declaratory relief on the issue of whether California “[Civil Code section 2924, subdivision (a)] allows a borrower, before his or her property is sold, to bring a civil action in order to test whether the person electing to sell the property is, or is duly authorized to so by, the owner of a beneficial interest in it.” The court noted that although designated a cause of action for declaratory relief, the second cause of action served simply as a legal argument in support of the first cause of action. The defendants filed a demurrer as to the first and second causes of action, which the trial court sustained without leave to amend.
In sustaining the ruling of the trial court, the appellate court first noted that California’s non-judicial foreclosure scheme is set forth in California Civil Code sections 2924 through 2924k, which “provide a comprehensive framework for the regulation of a non-judicial foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale contained in a deed of trust.” The court noted that “[t]he purposes of [the] comprehensive scheme are threefold: (1) to provide the creditor/beneficiary with a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor; (2) to protect the debtor/trustor from wrongful loss of the property; and (3) to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.” Finally, the court stated that
“[b]ecause of the exhaustive nature of this scheme, California appellate courts have refused to read any additional requirements into the non-judicial foreclosure statute.”
With the purpose of California’s comprehensive non-judicial foreclosure scheme in mind, the court ruled that the borrower was “attempting to interject the courts into” the scheme without pointing to any legal authority to do so. The borrower argued that such authority was provided by Civil Code section 2924, subdivision (a). The court rejected the argument noting that Section 2924, subdivision (a)(1) states that a “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents” may initiate the foreclosure process. The court further ruled that “nowhere does the statute provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure process is indeed authorized, and we see no ground for implying such an action.”
The court then discussed three federal district court cases, which the borrower cited as purported legal authority for the alleged right to challenge an entity’s ability to initiate the foreclosure process. The court found that the cases were not controlling, nor were they on point, as none recognized “a cause of action requiring the noteholder's nominee to prove its authority to initiate a foreclosure proceeding.” Further, the court noted that “the district court cases from outside of California are inapposite because they do not apply California non-judicial foreclosure law.”
Finally, the borrower argued that even if California's non-judicial foreclosure law did not provide for the filing of a lawsuit to determine whether MERS had been authorized by the holder of the Note to initiate a foreclosure, the court should nevertheless interpret such a right as the “[l]egislature may not have contemplated or had time to fully respond to the present situation.” Again, the court rejected this argument, finding that “because California's non-judicial foreclosure statute is unambiguously silent on any right to bring the type of action identified by [the borrower], there is no basis for the courts to create such a right.” The court therefore held that “the trial court properly sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the first and second causes of action in [the borrower’s] complaint.”
In addition, the appellate court went on to hold that “[a]s an independent ground for affirming the order sustaining the demurrer. . . even if there was a legal basis for an action to determine whether MERS has authority to initiate a foreclosure proceeding, the deed of trust. . . establishes as a factual matter that [borrower’s] claims lack merit.” The court noted that the language of the deed expressly stated MERS had the authority to initiate a foreclosure.
Finally, the court held that the borrower would not be able to cure the defects of his complaint simply by amending the allegations. The court therefore held that “the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.”
Thursday, February 24, 2011
FBI Cracks Down on Mortgage Fraud Schemes Across the Country
As the housing market struggles to get back on its feet, one element holding it back is the prevalence of fraud that increases in times of trouble. In December the CoreLogic Fraud Index revealed fraud losses for 2010 were estimated to be $11 billion. In the past week, the FBI has reported several convictions for mortgage fraud schemes all over the country. The agency says scams involving false promises and fraudulent sales pitches will continue to be a major focus.
http://www.dsnews.com/articles/fbi-cracks-down-on-mortgage-fraud-schemes-across-country-2011-02-23
http://www.dsnews.com/articles/fbi-cracks-down-on-mortgage-fraud-schemes-across-country-2011-02-23
U.S. Pushes for Deal in Mortgage-Servicing Cases
The Obama administration is trying to push through a settlement over mortgage-servicing breakdowns that could force America's largest banks to pay for reductions in loan principal worth billions of dollars, the Wall Street Journal reported today. Terms of the administration's proposal include a commitment from mortgage servicers to reduce the loan balances of troubled borrowers who owe more than their homes are worth. The cost of those writedowns will not be borne by investors who purchased mortgage-backed securities. If a unified settlement can be reached, some state attorneys general and federal agencies are pushing for banks to pay more than $20 billion in civil fines or to fund a comparable amount of loan modifications for distressed borrowers.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703842004576162813248586844.html?mod=WSJ_business_LeadStoryCollection#printMode
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703842004576162813248586844.html?mod=WSJ_business_LeadStoryCollection#printMode
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
FDIC Tips
A Consumer Message from FDIC Chairman Bair for America Saves Week
This is America Saves Week. But it’s hard to talk about putting money away during these tough economic times, let alone actually doing it.
The good news is that even as we are working to dig out of the recent recession, Americans are finding ways to save more money. The recent financial crisis has wreaked economic havoc on a lot of families. But if there is one silver lining, it is that we have learned the hard lessons of too much borrowing. We are paying down our debt and saving more. In the process, we are rediscovering the peace of mind of financial security achieved through saving.
It doesn’t have to be hard to find $10 a week to save. Do you buy your lunch every day when you’re at work? Instead, make a sandwich or salad at home and bring it into the office once or twice a week. Or skip your afternoon snack from the vending machine.
Eventually, this savings can add up to a lot. If you put $10 every week into a savings account and even if it earns only 1 percent interest, you will have more than $2,600 in five years, $5,400 in 10 years, and more than $11,500 in 20 years – perhaps just when you are ready to retire or need that money to send a child off to college. Compare this to just making minimum payments on a credit card balance of $5,000. Paying an interest rate of 15 percent, it would take 24 years to repay the balance, and you would pay more than $7,000 in interest to your credit card company.
There are easy ways to make saving automatic. Open up a savings account if you don’t already have one and have a portion of your paycheck deposited directly into that account. Or ask your bank to regularly transfer a set amount of money from your checking account into the savings account. You can even have your tax refund directly deposited into your savings account.
Help your children save more, too. When you give them their allowance, pay them a little extra – say a quarter or 50 cents -- to put straight into their piggy banks. That way you will teach them the value of saving automatically. Buy them a clear plastic piggy bank or some other transparent container so they can watch their quarters pile up and grow. After they’ve accumulated several dollars, take that money to the bank and put it in a safe, FDIC-insured bank account. Many banks offer savings accounts just for kids with no fees and no minimum-balance requirements.
By allowing children to accrue savings and earn interest from an early age, children’s savings accounts can finance much of a child’s college education. Studies show that even a small amount of savings significantly influences a child’s desire to attend college. Moreover, built up over time, children’s savings accounts can reduce reliance on student loans and ease young people’s financial burden. Tragically, last year, college graduates started out in life owing an average of $24,000 in student debt.
We owe it to ourselves and to our kids to have the peace of mind of a secure financial future. Let’s budget, save and spend responsibly. Who knows? Maybe the government will get the same idea and stop spending and borrowing so much, too.
During this America Saves Week, I encourage all Americans to join me and my family in making a renewed savings commitment. Let’s resolve to maintain that commitment throughout the years to come.
This is America Saves Week. But it’s hard to talk about putting money away during these tough economic times, let alone actually doing it.
The good news is that even as we are working to dig out of the recent recession, Americans are finding ways to save more money. The recent financial crisis has wreaked economic havoc on a lot of families. But if there is one silver lining, it is that we have learned the hard lessons of too much borrowing. We are paying down our debt and saving more. In the process, we are rediscovering the peace of mind of financial security achieved through saving.
It doesn’t have to be hard to find $10 a week to save. Do you buy your lunch every day when you’re at work? Instead, make a sandwich or salad at home and bring it into the office once or twice a week. Or skip your afternoon snack from the vending machine.
Eventually, this savings can add up to a lot. If you put $10 every week into a savings account and even if it earns only 1 percent interest, you will have more than $2,600 in five years, $5,400 in 10 years, and more than $11,500 in 20 years – perhaps just when you are ready to retire or need that money to send a child off to college. Compare this to just making minimum payments on a credit card balance of $5,000. Paying an interest rate of 15 percent, it would take 24 years to repay the balance, and you would pay more than $7,000 in interest to your credit card company.
There are easy ways to make saving automatic. Open up a savings account if you don’t already have one and have a portion of your paycheck deposited directly into that account. Or ask your bank to regularly transfer a set amount of money from your checking account into the savings account. You can even have your tax refund directly deposited into your savings account.
Help your children save more, too. When you give them their allowance, pay them a little extra – say a quarter or 50 cents -- to put straight into their piggy banks. That way you will teach them the value of saving automatically. Buy them a clear plastic piggy bank or some other transparent container so they can watch their quarters pile up and grow. After they’ve accumulated several dollars, take that money to the bank and put it in a safe, FDIC-insured bank account. Many banks offer savings accounts just for kids with no fees and no minimum-balance requirements.
By allowing children to accrue savings and earn interest from an early age, children’s savings accounts can finance much of a child’s college education. Studies show that even a small amount of savings significantly influences a child’s desire to attend college. Moreover, built up over time, children’s savings accounts can reduce reliance on student loans and ease young people’s financial burden. Tragically, last year, college graduates started out in life owing an average of $24,000 in student debt.
We owe it to ourselves and to our kids to have the peace of mind of a secure financial future. Let’s budget, save and spend responsibly. Who knows? Maybe the government will get the same idea and stop spending and borrowing so much, too.
During this America Saves Week, I encourage all Americans to join me and my family in making a renewed savings commitment. Let’s resolve to maintain that commitment throughout the years to come.
Monday, February 21, 2011
Of News
Christopher Perry- AZ’s Stern in Criminal Trouble
MERS Surrenders?
http://blog.chinkinthearmor.net/wordpress/?p=646
_____________________________________________________________
Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), No. 09-32489, slip op., 9th Cir. BAP, Feb. 4, 2011.
The automatic stay which terminates 30 days after the filing of a petition, filed within a year of the dismissal of a prior case, pursuant to § 362(c)(3) terminates as to both the debtor and property of the estate.
________________________________________________________________
Federal Housing Finance Agency
Foreclosure Prevention & Refinance Report
Third Quarter 2010
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/19606/3q10_fpr_final.pdf
Mortage Morass-ConsiderChapter13.org
http://considerchapter13.org/mortgage-morass/
Obama seeking to wind down Fannie, Freddie
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41529119
Related
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021006634.html
http://seekingalpha.com/article/252290-housing-s-three-headed-foe-rears-its-ugly-head
http://www.mortgageorb.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.7750
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/09/real_estate/underwater_mortgages_rising/
MERS no Right to Transfer Mortgage
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-14/merscorp-has-no-right-to-transfer-mortgages-u-s-judge-says.html
Chase and Military Members
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-14/merscorp-has-no-right-to-transfer-mortgages-u-s-judge-says.html
MERS Surrenders?
http://blog.chinkinthearmor.net/wordpress/?p=646
_____________________________________________________________
Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), No. 09-32489, slip op., 9th Cir. BAP, Feb. 4, 2011.
The automatic stay which terminates 30 days after the filing of a petition, filed within a year of the dismissal of a prior case, pursuant to § 362(c)(3) terminates as to both the debtor and property of the estate.
________________________________________________________________
Federal Housing Finance Agency
Foreclosure Prevention & Refinance Report
Third Quarter 2010
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/19606/3q10_fpr_final.pdf
Mortage Morass-ConsiderChapter13.org
http://considerchapter13.org/mortgage-morass/
Obama seeking to wind down Fannie, Freddie
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41529119
Related
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021006634.html
http://seekingalpha.com/article/252290-housing-s-three-headed-foe-rears-its-ugly-head
http://www.mortgageorb.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.7750
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/09/real_estate/underwater_mortgages_rising/
MERS no Right to Transfer Mortgage
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-14/merscorp-has-no-right-to-transfer-mortgages-u-s-judge-says.html
Chase and Military Members
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-14/merscorp-has-no-right-to-transfer-mortgages-u-s-judge-says.html
Social Media
Seduced: For Lawyers, the Appeal of Social Media Is Obvious. It’s Also Dangerous
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/seduced_for_lawyers_the_appeal_of_social_media_is_obvious_dangerous/
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/seduced_for_lawyers_the_appeal_of_social_media_is_obvious_dangerous/
Stern Update
Last week in Lee County, an attorney for David Stern’s office begged for leniency (and got it time and time again) by arguing that they were withdrawing from 150,000 cases across the State of Florida. The company had only approximately 50 employees remaining as of last notice. Guess Stern is taking a financial hit personally- he’s liquidating assets.
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/fl-david-stern-luxury-properties-20110218,0,3087303.story
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/fl-david-stern-luxury-properties-20110218,0,3087303.story
Foreclosure Cases
Augenstein v Deutsche Bank
http://mattweidnerlaw.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/11-01-17-Final-Order-Opinion-1.pdf
2nd DCA SMACKDOWN- Attorney’s Fees Due in Foreclosure Cases!
http://mattweidnerlaw.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/South-Bay-Lakes-Homeowners-Association.pdf
http://mattweidnerlaw.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/11-01-17-Final-Order-Opinion-1.pdf
2nd DCA SMACKDOWN- Attorney’s Fees Due in Foreclosure Cases!
http://mattweidnerlaw.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/South-Bay-Lakes-Homeowners-Association.pdf
Denial- You arte in Distress
Bachelor Aaron Buerge: I'm in Bankruptcy, But Not Broke
The happily married former "Bachelor" star found true love over the course of the reality show in 2002 only to call it quits not one month later. In a somewhat insightful commentary on his debts, amounting to more than four times his assets, Buerge asserts, "I'm not in financial distress - nothing like that."
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20467397,00.html
The happily married former "Bachelor" star found true love over the course of the reality show in 2002 only to call it quits not one month later. In a somewhat insightful commentary on his debts, amounting to more than four times his assets, Buerge asserts, "I'm not in financial distress - nothing like that."
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20467397,00.html
MERS
This is a follow-up piece on the decision, from the Wall Street Journal: http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2011/02/14/us-bankruptcy-judge-questions-legal-claims-of-mers/
The actual holding of the case granted the MFR in favor of the movant, on the grounds that the prior judicial foreclosure ruling the party was trying to enforce was res judicata; the exciting part of the decision comes when the judge holds that not withstanding the ruling, in future cases where a party appears in court with a claim based on an assignment from MERS, they will be out of luck...this is the actual ruling: http://www.nyeb.uscourts.gov/opinions/reg/334499_41_opinion.pdf
http://www.dsnews.com/articles/conflicting-rulings-abound-in-mers-judgments-2011-02-17
The actual holding of the case granted the MFR in favor of the movant, on the grounds that the prior judicial foreclosure ruling the party was trying to enforce was res judicata; the exciting part of the decision comes when the judge holds that not withstanding the ruling, in future cases where a party appears in court with a claim based on an assignment from MERS, they will be out of luck...this is the actual ruling: http://www.nyeb.uscourts.gov/opinions/reg/334499_41_opinion.pdf
http://www.dsnews.com/articles/conflicting-rulings-abound-in-mers-judgments-2011-02-17
Borders' First Day Motions
Here is the Declaration supporting the Borders' First Day Motions. Tells you the structure of the company, what went wrong, the general plan. I always find these fascinating. Of course they have two stores in Manhattan which is why they filed there.
http://www.bordersreorganization.com/pdflib/20_10614.pdf
I love Borders. I am going to miss them, the one on Gulf to Bay is Closing.
http://www.bordersreorganization.com/pdflib/20_10614.pdf
I love Borders. I am going to miss them, the one on Gulf to Bay is Closing.
Dressing for Work
The USB ( a Swiss Company) published a 43 page guidelines on proper dress code. From the exerts it looks like a good idea, and that American are no longer the only ones who have forgoten how to dress for Work.
There was the usual advice about wearing dark gray, black, or navy blue (they "symbolize competence, formalism, and sobriety"), warnings about skirt length (they should hit the middle of the knee), and the plea for "light makeup" (foundation, mascara, and "discreet" lipstick).
Then, UBS offered these tidbits:
• Don't wear "designer stubble" or "excessive facial hair" if you are male (or female, I suppose).
• Do wear timepieces, "since wristwatches suggest reliability and great care for punctuality." But don't wear earrings if you are male.
• Don't eat garlic or smoke cigarettes to avoid imparting bad odor.
http://thecareerist.typepad.com/thecareerist/2011/02/dress-codes.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2Fpcnu+%28The+Careerist%29
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704694004576019783931381042.html
http://blogs.hbr.org/hbr/hewlett/2011/02/dress_for_the_job_you_want.html
http://www.vancouversun.com/life/business/3982457/story.html?tab=PHOT
http://www.vancouversun.com/life/dress+code+bankers+Select+translated+text+from+page+tome/3987980/story.html
Some Exerts from the Code:
Do's
For women:
• Wear your jacket buttoned.
• When sitting, the buttons should be unfastened.
• Make sure to touch up hair regrowth regularly if you color your hair.
For men:
• Store your suit on a large hanger with rounded shoulders to preserve the shape of the garment.
• Schedule barber appointments every four weeks to maintain your haircut shape.
Don'ts
• Eating garlic and onions
• Smoking or spending time in smoke-filled places
• Wearing short-sleeved shirts or cuff links
• Wearing socks that are too short, showing your skin while sitting
• Allowing underwear to be seen
• Touching up perfume during or after lunch break
• Using tie knots that don't match your face shape and/or body shape
Hey if their parents don't teach them how to dress some one has to. I say publish it again an the critics be damned! I hope they added no face piring and visable tats to their list!
There was the usual advice about wearing dark gray, black, or navy blue (they "symbolize competence, formalism, and sobriety"), warnings about skirt length (they should hit the middle of the knee), and the plea for "light makeup" (foundation, mascara, and "discreet" lipstick).
Then, UBS offered these tidbits:
• Don't wear "designer stubble" or "excessive facial hair" if you are male (or female, I suppose).
• Do wear timepieces, "since wristwatches suggest reliability and great care for punctuality." But don't wear earrings if you are male.
• Don't eat garlic or smoke cigarettes to avoid imparting bad odor.
http://thecareerist.typepad.com/thecareerist/2011/02/dress-codes.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2Fpcnu+%28The+Careerist%29
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704694004576019783931381042.html
http://blogs.hbr.org/hbr/hewlett/2011/02/dress_for_the_job_you_want.html
http://www.vancouversun.com/life/business/3982457/story.html?tab=PHOT
http://www.vancouversun.com/life/dress+code+bankers+Select+translated+text+from+page+tome/3987980/story.html
Some Exerts from the Code:
Do's
For women:
• Wear your jacket buttoned.
• When sitting, the buttons should be unfastened.
• Make sure to touch up hair regrowth regularly if you color your hair.
For men:
• Store your suit on a large hanger with rounded shoulders to preserve the shape of the garment.
• Schedule barber appointments every four weeks to maintain your haircut shape.
Don'ts
• Eating garlic and onions
• Smoking or spending time in smoke-filled places
• Wearing short-sleeved shirts or cuff links
• Wearing socks that are too short, showing your skin while sitting
• Allowing underwear to be seen
• Touching up perfume during or after lunch break
• Using tie knots that don't match your face shape and/or body shape
Hey if their parents don't teach them how to dress some one has to. I say publish it again an the critics be damned! I hope they added no face piring and visable tats to their list!
Michigan Bankruptcy Case
6th Circuit: Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer)
Citation:
2011 Fed. App. 0002P(6th Cir BAP 2011)
Ruling:
Michigan's bankruptcy specific exemption statute (Mich. Comp. Laws Section 600.5451) is unconstitutional under the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution (Article I, sec. 8, cl.4). Judgment of the bankrutpcy court is reversed. The Court found that since Michigan had not opted out of the federal exemption statute established under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(d), Michigan debtors could elect either state or federal exemptions.
Citation:
2011 Fed. App. 0002P(6th Cir BAP 2011)
Ruling:
Michigan's bankruptcy specific exemption statute (Mich. Comp. Laws Section 600.5451) is unconstitutional under the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution (Article I, sec. 8, cl.4). Judgment of the bankrutpcy court is reversed. The Court found that since Michigan had not opted out of the federal exemption statute established under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(d), Michigan debtors could elect either state or federal exemptions.
Banks Push Home Buyers To Put Down More Cash
The down payments demanded by banks of homebuyers have ballooned since the housing bust, forcing many people to rethink what they can afford and potentially shrinking the pool of eligible buyers, the Wall Street Journal reported today. Last week, the Obama administration called for gradually raising down payments to a minimum of 10 percent on conventional loans, meaning those that can be bought or guaranteed by mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The median down payment in nine major U.S. cities rose to 22 percent last year on properties purchased through conventional mortgages. FHA-backed mortgages, which require 3.5 percent up front, made up about half of loans for home purchases last year, according to housing-research firm Zelman & Associates, but borrowers often pay higher interest rates and must pay private mortgage insurance, often driving their monthly payments higher.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703312904576146532935600542.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_personalfinance#printMode
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703312904576146532935600542.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_personalfinance#printMode
REPORT: CREDIT CARD LAW AIDS TRANSPARENCY
A report released yesterday by nonprofit research group Center for Responsible Lending said that the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CreditCARD Act) has made billions of dollars in charges more transparent for consumers, which should help lower costs over the long term, the Wall Street Journal reported. The report examines the impact of federal credit card rules on consumers one year after many of the new rules mandated by the CreditCARD Act were put in place. To recoup lost revenues, banks have rolled out new fees since passage of the CARD Act.
http://dizzy.abiworld.org/t/1516236/201584/6832/0/
http://dizzy.abiworld.org/t/1516236/201584/6832/0/
FDIC NEWS
Ms. Sheila C. Blair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation gave a comprehensive statement regarding the status of the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate; 538 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington D.C.
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spfeb1711.html
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spfeb1711.html
Stanford Law School
While the rest of the university will endure a 3.5% tuition hike for the 2011-12 academic year, Stanford Law School will receive a special 5.75% tuition hike. The law school currently charges $44,880 in tuition alone. Once you include books and other living expenses, the suggested budget for a Stanford Law student is $71,535 per year.
http://thecareerist.typepad.com/thecareerist/2011/02/law-school-news-feb.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2Fpcnu+%28The+Careerist%29
Never Thought my $100,000 legal education was cheap until now! Compared to $214,605.00 it's a bargin.
http://thecareerist.typepad.com/thecareerist/2011/02/law-school-news-feb.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2Fpcnu+%28The+Careerist%29
Never Thought my $100,000 legal education was cheap until now! Compared to $214,605.00 it's a bargin.
7th Cir Says FDCPA Debt Collector May Contact Debtor's Attorney After Payment Refusal, Communications-Stop Demand
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that the FDCPA does not prevent a debt collector from communicating with a debtor’s attorney after the debtor refuses payment and requests that the debt collector cease communications with the debtor.
After receiving demands from a debt collector for payment of a debt, a debtor retained a lawyer, who sent the debt collector a letter stating that the debtor refused to pay and lacked assets that the creditor could seize. The letter concluded: “we request that you cease all further collection activities and direct all future communications to our office.”
The debt collector refrained from calling or writing to the debtor, but did call the lawyer with a request for payment. The debtor then filed a lawsuit asserting violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c) of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The debtor alleged that by contacting the attorney the debt collector violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on contacting a debtor after he refuses to pay a debt. The district court found in favor of the debt collector, holding that the debtor’s lawyer was not a “consumer” as defined in the FDCPA and therefore that communications with him were not prohibited.
As you may recall, in relevant portion, §1692c(c) provides that where “a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer” then “the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer” except under certain limited circumstances. Section 1692c(d) defines the word “consumer” for the purpose of §1692c. It provides that “consumer” includes “consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.”
The debtor argued that whether or not a debtor’s lawyer was “the consumer,” the lawyer was the debtor’s agent, and therefore that communications to the lawyer should be treated as communications to the debtor. The debtor noted that 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2) defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” The debtor then reasoned that anything a debt collector says to a debtor’s lawyer is an indirect communication to the debtor. The debtor therefore argued that once a debtor invokes his rights under §1692c(c), any communication to either the debtor or his lawyer is forbidden, unless it comes within one of the exceptions of the FDCPA. The Court noted that at least one district judge had accepted the argument made by debtor. However, the Court also noted that no appellate court had addressed the issue.
In rejecting the debtor’s argument, the Seventh Circuit held that subsections (a) and (b) of §1692c provided guidance as to whether a debtor’s attorney was intended to be included in the definition of “consumer.” Subsections (a) and (b) provide as follows in relevant portion:
"(a) Communication with the consumer generally
"Without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt—
* * *
"(2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer; or
* * *
"(b) Communication with third parties
"Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector."
The Court stated that the debtor’s “argument makes hash of [subsections (a) and (b)], because if the word ‘consumer’ is replaced by ‘lawyer’ (whether because a lawyer is a ‘consumer’ or because a communication to a lawyer is an indirect communication to a consumer) both subsections become gibberish.” The Court further found that “[t]he problem is not simply that the words ‘consumer’ and ‘attorney’ must mean different things in this subsection,” but also that “the point of subsection (a)(2) is to tell the debt collector that it is OK to communicate with the debtor’s attorney even when it is forbidden to communicate with the debtor.”
The Seventh Circuit therefore ruled that to read §1692a(2) as prohibiting communications with a debtor’s attorney would be implausible. It noted that such a reading would prevent debt collectors from engaging in settlement negotiations with an attorney to avoid litigation. The Court questioned: “Why would Congress have provided that hiring a lawyer makes it impossible for the debtor and debt collector to communicate through counsel?”
Ultimately, the Court held Congress did not intend such a result. The Court reasoned that the debtor’s reading of the FDCPA “causes serious problems for the structure and operation of subsections (a)(2) and (b), and is not supported by subsection (d)—which. . . does not include the debtor’s lawyer in the definition of ‘consumer.’”
Therefore, the Court concluded that “§1692c as a whole permits debt collectors to communicate freely with consumers’ lawyers.”
After receiving demands from a debt collector for payment of a debt, a debtor retained a lawyer, who sent the debt collector a letter stating that the debtor refused to pay and lacked assets that the creditor could seize. The letter concluded: “we request that you cease all further collection activities and direct all future communications to our office.”
The debt collector refrained from calling or writing to the debtor, but did call the lawyer with a request for payment. The debtor then filed a lawsuit asserting violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c) of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The debtor alleged that by contacting the attorney the debt collector violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on contacting a debtor after he refuses to pay a debt. The district court found in favor of the debt collector, holding that the debtor’s lawyer was not a “consumer” as defined in the FDCPA and therefore that communications with him were not prohibited.
As you may recall, in relevant portion, §1692c(c) provides that where “a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer” then “the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer” except under certain limited circumstances. Section 1692c(d) defines the word “consumer” for the purpose of §1692c. It provides that “consumer” includes “consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.”
The debtor argued that whether or not a debtor’s lawyer was “the consumer,” the lawyer was the debtor’s agent, and therefore that communications to the lawyer should be treated as communications to the debtor. The debtor noted that 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2) defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” The debtor then reasoned that anything a debt collector says to a debtor’s lawyer is an indirect communication to the debtor. The debtor therefore argued that once a debtor invokes his rights under §1692c(c), any communication to either the debtor or his lawyer is forbidden, unless it comes within one of the exceptions of the FDCPA. The Court noted that at least one district judge had accepted the argument made by debtor. However, the Court also noted that no appellate court had addressed the issue.
In rejecting the debtor’s argument, the Seventh Circuit held that subsections (a) and (b) of §1692c provided guidance as to whether a debtor’s attorney was intended to be included in the definition of “consumer.” Subsections (a) and (b) provide as follows in relevant portion:
"(a) Communication with the consumer generally
"Without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt—
* * *
"(2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer; or
* * *
"(b) Communication with third parties
"Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector."
The Court stated that the debtor’s “argument makes hash of [subsections (a) and (b)], because if the word ‘consumer’ is replaced by ‘lawyer’ (whether because a lawyer is a ‘consumer’ or because a communication to a lawyer is an indirect communication to a consumer) both subsections become gibberish.” The Court further found that “[t]he problem is not simply that the words ‘consumer’ and ‘attorney’ must mean different things in this subsection,” but also that “the point of subsection (a)(2) is to tell the debt collector that it is OK to communicate with the debtor’s attorney even when it is forbidden to communicate with the debtor.”
The Seventh Circuit therefore ruled that to read §1692a(2) as prohibiting communications with a debtor’s attorney would be implausible. It noted that such a reading would prevent debt collectors from engaging in settlement negotiations with an attorney to avoid litigation. The Court questioned: “Why would Congress have provided that hiring a lawyer makes it impossible for the debtor and debt collector to communicate through counsel?”
Ultimately, the Court held Congress did not intend such a result. The Court reasoned that the debtor’s reading of the FDCPA “causes serious problems for the structure and operation of subsections (a)(2) and (b), and is not supported by subsection (d)—which. . . does not include the debtor’s lawyer in the definition of ‘consumer.’”
Therefore, the Court concluded that “§1692c as a whole permits debt collectors to communicate freely with consumers’ lawyers.”
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