Dickson- Countrywide (6th Cir.)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled that a Chapter 13 debtor whose mobile home was involuntarily converted to real property by court order had standing to seek avoidance of a perfected lien on the real property under Section 522(h)(1) of the bankruptcy code.

The borrower in this matter gave Countrywide Home Loans ("Countrywide") a note and mortgage on an unimproved lot in consideration for a loan. She then used the loan proceeds to purchase a manufactured home, and placed that home on the mortgaged real property. Under the terms of the mortgage, Countrywide was granted a lien against the real property and "all improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of that property." Several years later, the borrower filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and was granted a discharge; she did not reaffirm the debt.

After a subsequent default, Countrywide initiated foreclosure proceedings.

In its foreclosure complaint, Countrywide asserted that while the parties had intended the mortgage to secure a valid, first lien on the manufactured home, the borrower had failed to surrender the title to the manufactured home, thus preventing the Countrywide from noting its lien on the title to the manufactured home. Countrywide obtained a judgment from the state court that it had a valid first priority lien on the real property, that the real property be sold to satisfy Countrywide's lien, and that the manufactured home be "deemed converted to real estate."

Shortly thereafter, the borrower filed a Chapter 13 petition. Countrywide sought relief from the stay, but the borrower responded by filing an adversarial complaint, asserting that Countrywide had failed to properly perfect its lien on the manufactured home. Countrywide moved for summary judgment on the bases that the borrower lacked standing to bring the adversary proceeding because the mortgage lien was consensual, that the borrower's claim was barred by res judicata as a result of the prior Chapter 7 case, and that the prior state court judgment prevented avoidance of Countrywide's lien. The borrower filed a similar cross motion for summary judgment, disputing each of Countrywide's assertions.

The bankruptcy court denied both parties' motions, and ruled that the borrower did have standing because the lien at issue was created by a non-consensual judgment lien. After renewed cross motions from both parties, the bankruptcy court eventually again ruled in favor of the borrower, concluding that "the only manner in which to perfect a lien on a manufactured home under Kentucky law is by noting the lien on the certificate of title, that Countrywide had failed to perfect its lien, and that even if Countrywide had perfected its lien, such lien was avoidable as a preference." On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel upheld the bankruptcy court's judgment and order in favor of the borrower, and Countrywide appealed to the Sixth Circuit.

The Sixth Circuit noted that, under Kentucky law, "a manufactured home is personal property for which a certificate of title is required" and that "[i]n order to perfect a lien on personal property, the lien must be noted on the certificate of title." However, the Court also noted that "a manufactured home may also be converted from personal property to an improvement to real estate.thereby allowing perfection through first recording without notice."

The Court further noted that "the plain language of the mortgage contract did not grant Countrywide a lien on [the borrower's] manufactured home as personal property." Accordingly, "unless converted to an improvement to real estate, Countrywide did not obtain a security interest in the manufactured home through the mortgage contract."

The Court also considered various state-law decisions in ruling that "even if Countrywide obtained a lien against the manufactured home by way of the mortgage contract, it is undisputed that Countrywide did not note this security interest on the certificate of title, and the filing of a lis pendens cannot serve to perfect a security interest in a manufactured home" and thus, "before the state-court foreclosure judgment, Countrywide did not have a perfected lien on the borrower's manufactured home."

The Court then examined the state court order of sale converting the borrower's manufactured home to an improvement to real property, and concluded that the state court judgment created a perfected security interest in the manufactured home. The Court also noted that, because the borrower did not appeal the state court judgment, the conversion was binding under the doctrine of res judicata.

In addition, the conversion also placed the manufactured home "clearly within the terms of the mortgage contract," which then "granted a security interest in favor of Countrywide on the listed real estate, together with 'all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property.'"

Accordingly, the Court ruled, "upon the entry of the state-court judgment.

Countrywide possessed a perfected lien on the borrower's manufactured home."

The Court then considered whether the borrower had standing to seek avoidance of Countrywide's perfected lien. Considering the language of Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court ruled that "a Chapter 13 debtor has standing to avoid a transfer under Section 522(h) if five conditions are met: (1) the transfer was not voluntary; (2) the transfer was not concealed; (3) the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer;

(4) the debtor seeks the avoidance pursuant to Sections 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of the Bankruptcy Code; and (5) the transferred property is of a kind that the debtor would have been able to exempt from the estate if the trustee had avoided the transfer under one of the provisions in Section 522(g)."

The Court ruled that Countrywide did not obtain a perfected security interest in the manufactured home until it "was converted to an improvement to real estate, thereby bringing the home within the boundaries of the mortgage contract," and thus, "while a transfer in real property did occur through the mortgage contract, the mortgage was not the triggering transfer."

Rather, the Court ruled, the "conversion of [the borrower's] manufactured home to an improvement to real property was involuntary because it was accomplished by operation of law without consent." Countrywide did not dispute that the borrower met requirements 2 through 4 of Section 522(h), and therefore, the Court ruled, the borrower "possesses direct standing"

to avoid Countrywide's lien pursuant to Section 522(h).

Finally, the Court also considered whether the lien was properly avoided pursuant to Section 547, which as you may recall allows for the avoidance transfers within the 90 days period before the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court first examined a prior decision holding that under Section 547, "a transfer is deemed to have been made at the time the transfer is perfected, if perfection takes place more than 30 days after its creation."

However, the Court ruled, "the creation and perfection of Countrywide's interest in the manufactured home occurred at the time of the state-court judgment. [which was] well-within the 90-day preference period" and therefore, the Court ruled "Countrywide's lien on the manufactured home was properly avoided pursuant to Section 547.5."

7th Cir Reverses DWP of Putative FDCPA Class Action Claims

Kasalo-Harris& Harris

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reversed a lower court's decision to dismiss a putative class action lawsuit against a debt collector for want of prosecution, because the mistakes made by the plaintiff's attorney were not sufficient to justify the dismissal. A copy of the opinion is attached.


A consumer sued a debt collection law firm, Harris & Harris, Ltd. ("Harris") for alleged violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). Both parties agreed that Harris violated the FDCPA with respect to the consumer, and that the consumer was entitled to modest statutory damages. However, the consumer's attorney also included in his complaint two putative class counts, which alleged that the envelopes and payment reminders used by Harris to collect debts violated the FDCPA on a classwide basis.

The lower court "expressed doubt that it would ever certify a class" in this matter, but nevertheless continued the matter several times to permit the consumer's attorney to expand on and amend the putative class claims.

On several occasions, the consumer's attorney failed to meet the lower court's deadlines, and arrived for a hearing after the court had already considered his case. Due to the consumer's attorney's failure to appear and repeated failure to meet other deadlines, the lower court dismissed the case for want of prosecution.

As you may recall, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that "[i]f a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with.a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it." In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides that a court "must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action" at an "early practicable time."

The Seventh Circuit held that the lower's court decision to dismiss the action for want of prosecution was an abuse of discretion. In reaching that conclusion, the Court first noted that dismissal for want of prosecution is an "extraordinarily harsh sanction." Gabriele v. Hamlin, 514 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 2008). In addition, dismissal for want of prosecution should be imposed based on a consideration of, among several other factors, whether the mistakes made are the responsibility of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's lawyer, and the prejudice to the defendant as a result of those mistakes. Aurora Lamp & Lighting Inc. v. International Trading Corp, 325 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2003).

Here, the Court indicated that the attorney's fees Harris had to incur due to the repeated errors of the consumer's counsel were not sufficient prejudice, and noted that all of the mistakes made were attributable to the consumer's attorney, rather than to the consumer herself.

In addition, the Court noted that despite the questionable nature of the class action claims, the borrower's individual allegation against Harris appeared to have merit. It also observed that several less severe mechanisms were available to dismiss the class action claims: the lower court could have used Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) to dismiss only the class action claims, allowing the individual claim to survive, or it could have declined to certify the action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

The Court placed emphasis on the fact that the borrower's attorney did not receive any warning from the lower court that he was on "thin ice."

Therefore, "[g]iven the nature of [the borrower's attorney's] mistakes, the court's ongoing approach to the case, and the lack of any explicit warning," the Court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision to dismiss the action for want of prosecution.

New Jersey Sup Ct Applies Consumer Fraud Act to Post-Foreclosure Forbearance Agreements as "Extensions of Credit"

The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently held that certain post-foreclosure forbearance agreements were "extensions of credit" covered by the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, and that unconscionable practices in negotiating or collecting on such loan agreements would constitute violations of that statute.

A copy of the opinion is available at:

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/supreme/A9909GonzalezvWilshireCr
editCorp.pdf

The borrower on the loan at issue passed away. The surviving mortgagor continued to make payments on the loan in order to avoid foreclosure. The surviving mortgagor eventually defaulted on the loan, and the loan owner filed a foreclosure action.

Before the scheduled sheriff's sale of the property took place, the mortgage servicer and surviving mortgagor entered into a written agreement ("First Agreement") whereby the servicer agreed not to pursue the foreclosure sale if the surviving mortgagor paid a specified lump sum and monthly payments, consisting of the original loan's monthly payments plus certain fees through a specified future date. The servicer also agreed to dismiss the foreclosure action when the account became current. After entering the First Agreement, the surviving mortgagor paid the majority of amounts due, but missed a number of monthly payments. The trial court then calculated the amount of arrears, and a sheriff's sale was again scheduled.

Soon thereafter, the servicer contacted the surviving mortgagor directly to negotiate a second agreement to avoid foreclosure of her home ("Second Agreement"). According to the allegations, neither the servicer nor the loan owner notified the mortgagor's attorney, and the surviving mortgagor allegedly could neither read nor speak English.

The Second Agreement, entirely in English, set the arrearages at roughly 68% higher than the amount calculated by the trial court a short time earlier and required the mortgagor to purchase force-placed insurance despite an active homeowner's insurance policy on the property. As in the First Agreement, the servicer agreed to dismiss the foreclosure action once the mortgage payments became current. Both agreements included language stating that the agreements were an attempt to collect a debt.

The surviving mortgagor made all payments required by the Second Agreement. However, instead of dismissing the foreclosure action as it had agreed, the servicer allegedly contacted the mortgagor when the Second Agreement was about to expire to notify her that another agreement was needed in order to avoid foreclosure. The mortgagor then notified her attorney, who, among other things, requested that the servicer explain how it calculated the amount of arrearages in the Second Agreement and why the loan was not considered current. The servicer allegedly was unable to provide an explanation as to the arrearages or the status of the loan.

The surviving mortgagor filed a complaint alleging that the servicer and loan owner had engaged in deceptive and unconscionable practices in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 - 195 ("NJCFA"). The complaint alleged that the servicer and loan owner, supposedly knowing that the surviving mortgagor did not read or speak English and that she was represented by an attorney, contacted her directly to negotiate the Second Agreement. The complaint further alleged that the servicer included in the Second Agreement improper costs and fees in calculating her arrearages and demanded amounts that were not yet due and owing.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the servicer and loan owner, holding that the NJCFA did not apply to "post-judgment settlement agreements entered into to stave off a foreclosure sale." The court reasoned that the NJCFA was not intended to apply to settlement agreements entered into by parties to a lawsuit, and that the surviving mortgagor's only option for relief was to file a motion to vacate, modify, or enforce the settlement.

The appellate court reversed the trial court judgment, holding that the agreements were contracts covered by the NJCFA and that the surviving mortgagor had standing under the NJCFA because she was a signatory to the post-judgment agreements. The appellate court also concluded, among other things, that, if proven, the surviving mortgagor's monetary damages from the servicer's alleged unconscionable practices satisfied the NJCFA's "ascertainable loss" requirement. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling, and reinstated the surviving mortgagor's alleged cause of action.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the NJCFA provides relief if a consumer can prove: (1) an unlawful practice prohibited by the CFA; (2) an "ascertainable loss"; and (3) a causal relationship between the misconduct and the loss. Citing Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255 (1997), the Supreme Court noted that the broad language of the NJCFA applies to lending activities and to the sale of insurance related to a loan, and that an unlawful practice under the CFA includes a person's use of "any unconscionable commercial practice . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person." The Court further observed that an "ascertainable loss" includes one incurred through improper "loan packing," such as forcing the borrower to purchase unnecessary insurance.

The Court rejected the defendants' assertion that the alleged collection activities of a servicer do not constitute "subsequent performance" in connection with a loan. Without deciding whether the forbearance agreements and the servicer's alleged collection activities were the "subsequent performance" with respect to the original loan, the Court concluded that "the post-judgment agreements, standing alone, constitute the extension of credit, or a new loan, and that [the servicer's] collection activities may be characterized as 'subsequent performance' in connection with [that] extension of credit."

The Court remarked that the servicer's alleged dealings with the surviving mortgagor "placed her on a credit merry-go-round" that "would keep her in a constant state of arrearages." The Court also further pointed out that these were not ordinary settlement agreements, as the mortgagor was not only required to pay the original monthly payments, but also additional charges such as foreclosure, attorney, and lender-placed insurance fees.

The Court enumerated certain factors regarding the servicer's alleged conduct with respect to the forbearance agreements that appeared questionable, including: (1) what this court described as the servicer's "inexplicably" contacting the surviving mortgagor and negotiating with her directly even though she was represented by an attorney and did not speak or read English; (2) the servicer's threat to foreclose even though the mortgagor allegedly had made every payment under the Second Agreement; (3) the servicer's alleged inability to explain how it arrived at the arrearages figure in the Second Agreement or why the loan was not considered current; and (4) the Second Agreement's requirement to purchase supposedly unnecessary lender-placed insurance.

The Court further rejected the servicer's and loan owner's argument that the NJCFA is not an available remedy and that the only options available to the mortgagor were either to seek relief from the post-judgment agreements or to pursue common law claims based on breach of contract and/or fraud. The Court observed that the relief available under the NJCFA is in addition to any other relief provided by state or federal law.

In addition, the Court stated that there was no need to address whether a direct relationship existed with the non-borrower mortgagor and the originating lender. Rather, the assignment of the note and mortgage to the loan owner and the appointment of the servicer substituted them for the originating lender with regard to the mortgagor. The Court also stated that, [a]s a practical matter . . . the agreements were nothing more than a recasting of the original loan," and concluded that the forbearance agreements established privity" between the parties.

In remanding to determine whether the defendants' conduct fell below the NJCFA's permissible standard, the Court stressed that its decision did not extend to settlement agreements generally. The Court limited its holding to the narrow issue of the applicability of the NJCFA to the creation of and collection on a post-foreclosure judgment agreement involving a stand-alone extension of credit.

Free Museum Day 9/24/11

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/museumday/ticket/?utm_source=dedicated&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20110907-MuseumDay

TILA Rescission Claim

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that the testimony of a borrower alone is sufficient to overcome TILA's presumption of delivery of TILA disclosures.

A copy of the opinion is available at:

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/094055p.pdf

The borrower brought a TILA rescission claim, specifically alleging that she did not receive the notices of her right to cancel at the closing on her home, and further, that to the extent she did receive the notices in the mail after the closing, they were not clear and conspicuous as required by TILA because they listed the wrong final rescission date and because they were received only after the loan funds had been disbursed.

Thus, according to the borrower, TILA's three-year extension of the right to rescind under the mortgages was triggered. The jury entered a verdict in favor of the lender on this TILA rescission claim.

On appeal, the borrower challenged various aspects of the jury instructions, including the District Court's instruction that because her signature was on the notice of right to cancel, "something more than just [her] testimony . . . is needed to rebut the presumption that she received" the notice.

Examining the jury instruction at issue, the Court noted that, unless Congress or the Rules of Evidence provide otherwise, "a presumption in a civil case imposes the burden of production on the party against whom it is directed, but does not shift the burden of persuasion." Further, "the introduction of evidence to rebut a presumption destroys that presumption, leaving only that evidence and its inferences to be judged against the competing evidence and its inferences to determine the ultimate question at issue."

The Court then examined the language within TILA, specifically the provision stating that when a borrower signs a "written acknowledgment of receipt" of the disclosures required by TILA, his or her signature "does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof." The Court concluded that this language in TILA indicated that Congress did not intend that something more than the testimony of a borrower was required to overcome TILA's rebuttable presumption of receipt. Thus, the District Court's jury instruction to the contrary was in error.

Foreclosure Cases

http://richmangreerblog.com/2011/08/

This W. Palm Attorney does an awesome job briefing all the foreclosure cases in Florida each week.   Check him out.

Cal App Rules in Favor Of MERS in Wrongful Foreclosure Action, Rejects Allegations as to Improper Assignment of DOT

The California Court of Appeal, First District, recently held that: (1) in an action for wrongful foreclosure, the trial court had properly taken judicial notice of MERS's status as the lender's nominee; (2) the borrower's amended complaint did not state a cause of action arising from MERS's alleged improper assignment of the deed of trust; and (3) the borrower failed to state a claim for breach of an alleged foreclosure forbearance agreement, because the borrower did not attach to her complaint a copy of the document that purported to amend the agreement.


A copy of the opinion can be found at:

http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A130478.PDF

This case arose from a mortgage loan under which Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. ("MERS") was identified in the deed of trust as the nominee of the lender. The borrower defaulted on her loan and, at some point thereafter, MERS assigned "all beneficial interest" under the deed of trust, including the note, to HSBC Bank USA, N.A. ("HSBC"), as trustee. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), as the servicer of the loan and, acting on behalf of HSBC, subsequently recorded a substitution of trustee naming another defendant as the trustee, and allegedly foreclosed on the property and sold it.

The borrower filed suit seeking damages and an order voiding the foreclosure suit and her debt. The focus on appeal was the fourth amended complaint against Defendants-Respondents, Wells Fargo and MERS. The borrower alleged that the foreclosure was supposedly unlawful because: (1) MERS supposedly lacked the authority to assign the deed of trust and note to HSBC; and (2) Wells Fargo had purportedly breached an agreement with the borrower not to foreclose.

The borrower alleged she had a forbearance agreement under which Wells Fargo would suspend foreclosure proceedings if the borrower made a certain number of specified monthly payments. The forbearance agreement also provided that failure to make the required payments permitted Wells Fargo to terminate the agreement and to proceed with foreclosure. Soon after entering the alleged agreement, however, the borrower received a letter (the "March letter") from Wells Fargo stating that the "monthly mortgage
payments were being reduced . . . for the next six months." In accordance with the March letter, the borrower submitted a reduced payment amount. Wells Fargo then allegedly refused to accept the payment as
satisfaction of the borrower's obligations and proceeded to foreclose.

The trial court ordered the borrower to attach a copy of the purported "Special Forbearance Agreement" to her fourth amended complaint. The trial court then sustained Wells Fargo's demurrer without leave to amend partly because the fourth amended complaint failed to show reliance on the forbearance agreement, as the borrower attached only the original forbearance agreement to her complaint, but not a copy of the March letter that purported to amend the agreement.

With respect to MERS, the borrower alleged among other things that MERS was not the "true" beneficiary under the deed of trust, never had ownership of the promissory note, and never held an assignable interest in the note or deed of trust. In its demurrer, MERS argued that the borrower's allegations were contradicted by copies of the recorded documents MERS submitted to the court, including the assignment of the deed of trust. The trial court took judicial notice of these documents and sustained the MERS demurrer without leave to amend. The trial court noted that the borrower's claims did not state a cause of action against MERS because the "only apparent grounds for suing MERS are the allegations that the deed of trust improperly named MERS as nominee and beneficiary, and that there was no physical delivery of the note to HSBC."

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court in all respects.

First, the appellate court rejected the borrower's argument that it was error to take judicial notice of the recorded real property documents attached to MERS's demurrer and noted that where the authenticity of the documents is not being challenged, it is permissible to take judicial notice of the legal effect of the documents. The Court of Appeal cited a number of court decisions that "establish that a court may take judicial notice of the fact of a document's recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document's legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the documents' authenticity." The Court also noted that, contrary to the borrower's assertion, "MERS's status as beneficiary was not the type of fact that is generally an improper subject of judicial notice . . . since its status was not a matter of fact existing apart from the document itself." Instead, the Court noted, "MERS was the beneficiary under the deed of trust because, as a legally operative document, the deed of trust designated MERS as the beneficiary." The Court also observed that court decisions have generally found that the use of MERS as beneficiary does not invalidate otherwise proper foreclosure sales.

Also rejecting the borrower's argument that MERS had the burden of proving that a valid assignment had occurred, the Court noted that the nonjudicial foreclosure process is afforded a "presumption of regularity." Moreover, the Court stated that, contrary to the borrower's assertions, "the lack of a possessory interest in the note did not necessarily prevent MERS from having the authority to assign the note." The Court noted that as the lender's nominee, MERS had the authority to act as the lender's agent and that the complaint failed to show that MERS, as the nominee, lacked the authority to make the assignment of the note on behalf of the lender.

The Court also pointed out that in order to state a claim that the foreclosure sale was invalid because HSBC lacked the authority to foreclose, the borrower was required to allege not only that the MERS assignment was invalid, but also that HSBC did not receive an assignment of the debt in any manner whatsoever, which the borrower failed to do.

The Court observed that, unlike assignments of security interests, assignments of debt are commonly not recorded, and the original "lender could readily have assigned the promissory note to HSBC in an unrecorded document that was not disclosed to the [borrower]." The borrower had also failed to demonstrate how she had been prejudiced by the MERS assignment, especially in light of the general expectation that the promissory note would be assigned and that her obligations under the note to pay remained unchanged. The court also rejected the borrower's contention that the deed of trust was ambiguous.

As to the claim against Wells Fargo for the alleged violation of the forbearance agreement, like the trial court, the Court of Appeal noted that the borrower had failed to attach a copy of the March letter to her complaint even though the trial court granted her leave to amend on condition that she attach a copy of the forbearance agreement to her complaint. Noting that ordinarily the borrower would not be required to attach a copy of the March letter to the complaint, the Court pointed out that in light of the trial court's previous ruling on the earlier demurrer, the borrower was required to attach a copy of the original forbearance agreement as well as the March letter, which purported to amend the forbearance agreement on which she based her claim.

Finally, the Court also concluded that the borrower's complaint did not state a claim for promissory estoppel, because the borrower had given proper consideration in exchange for Wells Fargo's promise in the forbearance agreement not to foreclose.

New Eviction Method

http://consumerist.com/2011/08/landlord-suspected-of-releasing-thousands-of-scorpions-to-get-tenants-out.html

Interesting Site

http://consumerist.com/2011/08/

iPad or Other Tablet?

I want an IPAD- I covet the iPad and would love for Apple to send  me one like they have some legal blogger-- her that Apple?

But  there is even more reason to chose the iapd with all the IP suits and drama
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202510777839

Braids being cut off

What is going on in NY?   We have children getting their braids cut off on the way to school
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F10610FC345F10738DDDAE0A94D9405B8185F0D3

We have children getting their braids cut off in Kindergarten by classmates
http://www.essence.com/2010/02/24/bullies-cut-5-year-old-girls-hair/
They're young, but shouldn't they know better? If not addressed, the psychological effects of long-term bullying are bad enough without tacking on that now this five-year-old girl has to walk around with a patch of hair missing from the back of her head. 

Schools and Judges taking no action
http://www.cltmag.com/us-judge-finds-no-constitutional-damages-claim-in-bullying-case.html

Teacher chops off child's braid
http://www.essence.com/2009/12/15/crazytown-usa-braids-not-safe-in-milwauk/

 People need to teach their children to keep their hands off of other people  PERIOD.

When my son was in Pre-school- a religous one mind you, another child cut my son't face- he was 3 and 1/2 at the time. The school did nothing about it.   My son still has a scar to this day although a faint one.   I really wish I would have sued the school and the parents of the little psychopath !!  The  school system needs to protect these kids system needs to protect these kids.  It's just hair it will grow back is not acceptable.

Are we in a Recession or is it still to come?

I personally thought we were in a Recession, but the experts say it's still coming. See the attached story.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-08-11/recession-threatening-u-s-after-household-spending-s-consecutive-declines.html

Bankruptcy filings up in 2010 from 2009- No Suprise.

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 requires the director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to submit an annual report to Congress on certain bankruptcy statistics.

The report, which includes multiple charts and an interactive map, shows that more 1.5 million bankruptcy petitions were filed by individuals with predominately nonbusiness debt in 2010 – an increase of 9 percent over 2009.

London Riots?

The following was a quote about the riots in London off reuters.com:



“multicultural society, as the history shows, never works in times of lack of prosperity!

Real calamities always unite a culturally homogenous society-Japan an example; divides even more multicultural ones..

You are right! The changes to the unsustainable social systems are coming! “

I was wondering?

So what we start kicking people out of the country? Once we deport the foreigners,  who do we start on next? And what about those with multi ethnic backgrounds, which country do we send them to? How far back do we go since only the Indians were here in the first place and we decimated their civilization. Do I get to stay because I have 1/2  British Ancestors? Are there really any homogenous societies left?

OCC Consent orders

http://alfn.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/Bank_of_America.pdf


http://alfn.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/Citibank.pdf

http://alfn.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/HSBC.pdf

http://alfn.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/J.P._Morgan_Chase.pdf

http://alfn.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/LPS;_DocX.pdf

http://alfn.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/MERSCORP.pdf

http://alfn.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/MetLife.pdf

http://alfn.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/PNC.pdf

http://alfn.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/U.S._Bank.pdf