Monday, July 19, 2010

Stern Lawyers- Shady Past?

There are  posts all over the web that one of Stern's lawyers is a former Stripper and hooker.  

http://pibillwarner.wordpress.com/2009/10/25/strip-club-testimony-by-kelly-holsopple-a-stripper-and-former-prostitute-who-makes-good-changes-her-name-and-she-is-now-an-attorney-for-one-of-the-largest-foreclosure-mills-in-plantation-florida-how-a/


http://pibillwarner.wordpress.com/2010/04/22/kelly-holsopple-former-stripper-and-prostitute-for-the-mob-in-st-paul-minneapolis-metro-area-changed-her-name-and-is-now-a-member-of-the-florida-bar-taking-peoples-homes/



I ran a Florida Bar search on the 2 names in the article: Rebecca Rand and

Kelly Holsopple.   I did not find either listed on the Florida Bar website : 
                                                 http://www.floridabar.org/names.nsf/MESearch?OpenForm

I then ran a search of David Stern's attorneys:
                                          http://pview.findlaw.com/view/2209331_1

Cary, Stephen T.
Attorney

Evertz, Donna
Attorney

Glick, Donna Sue
Attorney

Katz, Robyn Rachel
Attorney

Little, Sandra Ann
Attorney

McComas, Beverly Ann
Attorney

Mendieta, Miriam L.
Attorney

Pollack, Billi K.
Attorney

Shum, Elsa Hernandez
Attorney

Silverglate, Samuel Hy
Attorney

Steiner, Mark Elliot
Attorney

Stern, David James
Attorney

Suglio, James
Attorney

Turner, Curtis C. Jr.
Attorney

Wasserman, Wendy Jill
Attorney



I do not see either of those names listed.   Did this person  ever exists?  Did they have a Florida Bar liscense? Or was it all made up? 

David J. Stern

As lawyer for several major banks, David J. Stern handles 20 percent of all foreclosure cases in the nation's fourth most populous state. It is from Stern's law firm that well over 100,000 Floridians, including many in the Tampa Bay area, have received the dreaded notice to pay up or face losing their homes.


The foreclosure business has been good to Stern, who lives in a $15 million Fort Lauderdale mansion and reaped $58.5 million by selling his back-office operations to a new public company in which he is a major shareholder.

The St. Pete times did an article on him this past week check it out at:




He apparently is camera shy, and pictures of him on the internet are hard to find.   I found one  at:

http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/07/17/exposed-foreclosure-mill-david-j-sterns-djsp-15-million-dollar-estate/




Other interesting sites with info related to Stern:
 
http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/

ForeclosureHamlet.org

4closureFraud.org

David J Stern




Friday, July 16, 2010

Bankruptcy Questions

What are the different bankruptcy chapters?


Most consumers are faced with the decision to file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy. There is also Chapter 11 bankruptcy, but that is generally reserved for businesses.   Chapter 9 are for cities and muncipalities, Chapter 12 are for family farmers and Ch 15  are  fore foreign enities with debts in the United States.

Chapter 7 is also known as a liquidation bankruptcy, in which most of your assets are auctioned off to pay your debts. You are allowed to keep certain assets by law. Chapter 13 is also known as reorganization bankruptcy, in which you work with your creditors to establish a repayment schedule for your debts. Of the two, Chapter 7 is the most common form of consumer bankruptcy.

Bankruptcy Questions on the Rise

The number of consumers seeking answers to bankruptcy questions is on the rise, according to information gathered from the American Bankruptcy Institute. That organization tracked a 14% increase in bankruptcy filings during the first six months of 2010, for a total number of 770,117 bankruptcy filings. This is the highest number of bankruptcies recorded since 2005, just before the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act took effect. According to the ABI, the record number of bankruptcies can be blamed on high amounts of consumer debt coupled with high levels of unemployment and the housing crisis. The agency predicts that the number of consumers filing for bankruptcy will reach 1.6 million by the end of 2010.






The top four questions  are:

What are the different bankruptcy chapters?

Should I file for bankruptcy?

What are any alternatives to bankruptcy?

Should I hire a bankruptcy attorney?

3rd Circuit Court of Appeals

U.S. SUPREME COURT DECIDES THAT BANKRUPTCY LAWYERS ARE "DEBT RELIEF AGENCIES" UNDER BAPCPA AND SUBJECT TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO DEBT RELIEF AGENCIES


Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1324, 176 L.Ed.2d 79 (3/8/2010)

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) amended the Bankruptcy Code to define a class of bankruptcy professionals termed "debt relief agencies" (DRAs). That class includes "any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person...for...payment...or who is a bankruptcy petition preparer." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A). This classification is significant under BAPCPA because DRAs are subject to multiple special rules under the Bankruptcy Code.

U.S. SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT BANKRUPTCY COURT'S LEGAL ERROR IN CONFIRMING A PLAN THAT DISCHARGED ACCRUED INTEREST ON A STUDENT LOAN DEBT ABSENT AN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING, AND A FINDING OF UNDUE HARDSHIP DID NOT RENDER THE JUDGMENT ON THE CONFIRMATION ORDER VOID

United Student Aid Funds Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (3/23/2010)

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve disagreement among the appeals court as to whether an order confirming a chapter 13 plan of reorganization that discharges student loan debt, in the absence of a finding of undue hardship pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8) and 1328 and in the absence of an adversary proceeding as required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(6), is a void judgment for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ALLOWS BID PROCEDURES THAT PROHIBIT SECURED LENDERS FROM CREDIT BIDDING

In re Philadelphia Newspapers LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir.) (5/7/2010) (Fisher, J.)

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's approval of chapter 11 debtors' bid procedures that precluded secured creditors from credit bidding (i.e., offsetting their bids with the value of their secured interest in the collateral) for the assets to be sold under the chapter 11 plan free of any lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D).


THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS OVERRULES IN RE FRENVILLE, REJECTING THE "ACCURAL TEST" AND INSTEAD ADOPTING THE POSITION THAT A CLAIM ARISES WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL IS EXPOSED PREPETITION TO A PRODUCT OR OTHER CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO AN INJURY, WHICH UNDERLIES A "RIGHT TO PAYMENT" UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

JELD-WEN Inc., f/k/a Grossman's Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman's Inc.), --F.3d--, 2010 WL 2181291 (3d Cir.) (6/2/2010) (Sloviter, J.)

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overruled precedent from In re Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), and explicitly rejected the longstanding "accrual test" for determining when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes. The debtor, a home improvement retailer that previously sold asbestos containing products, filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The debtor provided notice of the claims bar date, but did not suggest possible future asbestos liability.


BANKRUPTCY COURT UPHOLDS DEBTOR'S EXEMPTION OF INJURY LITIGATION PROCEEDS NOT RESULTING FROM PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT

In re Shumac, 425 B.R. 139 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.) (3/4/2010) (Thomas, J.)

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania allowed a debtor to claim the unliquidated proceeds from an unfiled automobile accident lawsuit as exempt. The court held that no permanent injury or impairment was required to establish an exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D) and found that any judgment or settlement for both personal injury and loss of consortium would qualify for exemption.

UPON DEATH OF DEBTOR, TRUSTEE HAS NO CLAIM TO PROPERTY THAT THE DEBTOR OWNED WITH HER NON-DEBTOR SPOUSE AS TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY, AS DEBTOR'S INTEREST, AND THEREFORE ESTATE'S INTEREST, IN THE PROPERTY TERMINATED UPON DEBTOR'S DEATH

Straffi v. Etoll (In re Etoll), 425 B.R. 743 (Bankr. D. N.J.) (3/5/2010) (Lyons, J.)

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey determined that the chapter 7 trustee could not compel the sale of entireties property under 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) that the debtor-wife possessed pre-petition when the debtor-wife died post-petition. The court determined that upon the death of the debtor-wife, the nondebtor husband became the sole owner of the entireties property, thereby removing the real property from property of the estate.

BANKRUPTCY COURT RULES THAT PROCEEDS OF A DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY ARE NOT PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE, AND EVEN IF THE POLICY PROCEEDS WERE PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE, CAUSE EXISTS TO LIFT THE AUTOMATIC STAY

In re Downey Financial Corp., 2010 WL 1838565 (Bankr. D. Del.) (5/7/2010) (Sontchi, J.)



BANKRUPTCY COURT FINDS THAT DOLLAR LIMITATION VENUE PROVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) IS APPLICABLE TO AVOIDANCE ACTIONS

Dynamerica Mfg. LLC v. Johnson Oil Co. (In re Dynamerica Mfg. LLC), 2010 WL 1930269 (Bankr. D. Del.) (5/10/2010) (Gross, J.)

Dynamerica Manufacturing LLC (the debtor) filed an adversary proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 550 to avoid and recover an allegedly preferential transfer in the amount of $6,599.85. In response, Johnson Oil Co. (the defendant) filed a Rule 12(b)(3) motion seeking to dismiss the adversary proceeding for improper venue based on 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b), which restricts venue to the district in which the defendant resides for proceedings to recover money or property from a noninsider of less than $10,950.00.

Clearwater Bar Seminar

Bankruptcy & Foreclosure Defense: The Effect on Lawyers and Realtors presented by the Clearwater & St. Petersburg Bar Associations

Seminar Chair : Carol A. Lawson, Esq.

Friday, July 30, 1:30 to 4:00 p.m.

Hilton at Carillon Park

950 Lake Carillon Drive, St. Petersburg 33716

2.0 CLER Credits

The 6th Circuit and the 2nd District Court of Appeal of Florida are leading the nation in efforts to bring practical solutions to the foreclosure crisis. The problems with the current foreclosure system are exhibited in the recent appellate court decisions, particularly BAC Funding and Verizzo. This seminar will provide an opportunity to hear practical solutions regarding systemic problems attorneys and realtors face with property in foreclosure and/or later bankruptcy.

Bankruptcy and real estate attorneys and realtors working with clients in foreclosure or who have filed bankruptcy will hear from the experts how these actions affect one's credit, future buying power and other issues. Attendees will learn how court-ordered foreclosure mediation will affect their practice and who qualifies for the program.

Friday, July 2, 2010

Consumer Bankruptcy Filings Up

U.S. consumer bankruptcy filings totaled 770,117 nationwide during the first six months of 2010 (Jan. 1-June 30), a 14 percent increase over the 675,351 total consumer filings during the same period a year ago.

Thursday, July 1, 2010

BigDeals.com = BigRipoff.Com is more like it!

Ok I admit it, I got taken to the tune of $97.50.   I was bidding on an IPad 3G 64GB.   

This is why it is a ripoff you bid the clock resets itself it never gets to zero!  None wins until people give up  so you could be at 30 seconds for days!    Then some items they will allow you to purchase at the so called retail price minus a  credit for your loyality bucks.   Now the do not let you use all of your loyalty  dollars on an item, only a percentage.

I looked at DSiw/ Mario game  they  say the retail is $ 198.49. They will allow $30 of the loalty bucks to be use so the  price is $168.49 plus shipping and handling.


YOU CAN BY THE DSii WITH A GAME FROM KMART FOR $149.00

Below is the response I recieved to my complaint about the clock, loyality bucks, and so called retail price:

Charley, Jul 02 08:08 am (PDT):


Hello,

We are sorry to hear you are finding your time with BigDeal.com to be frustrating. We have thousands of satisfied users and would love for you to be one, but we do realize our site is not for everyone. Everything is spelled out in our terms of service all users agree to upon registration. . Our goal is simply to add a bit of excitement to the shopping experience while providing access to great deals on popular products.

BigDeal.com is not like traditional auctions and our clock offers a small twist to keep things interesting. Please read more about our clock on our website http://support.bigdeal.com/entries/75639-how-does-the-auction-clock-work. Basically, the clock will keep resetting with each bid placed in the final seconds until the price reaches the retail Buy It Now price. With the exception of the iPad which does not offer a Buy It Now. It is rare when we have to pull the Buy It Now option on a product. We only do this when the supply is very limited (as it currently is on the iPads) since it is difficult to predict how many participants will proceed with a Buy It Now purchase when the auction does not turn out in their favor. Rather than drop a popular auction item altogether, we decided to proceed with the advice next to the bid button that Buy It Now is not available so users can make the best decision about participation based on their needs beforehand. If a user chooses to bid when there is no Buy It Now option, the do risk losing their used bids.

With regards to our Loyalty Bucks, they are a gift for purchasing bid packs, and it is an additional opportunity to save discounts on a variety of items.

Please let me know if I can assist you further.


Charley
BigDeal.com Customer Service

Seventh Circuit validates loan servicer plaintiffs, blasts real party in interest defense

CWCapital Asset Management, LLC v. Chicago Properties, LLC, et al.

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2574190, Case No. 09-3506,

Decided June 29, 2010



In CWCapital, the Seventh Circuit held that a loan servicer is a real party in interest, and thus able to maintain an action in its name. The plaintiff, as servicer for the subject loan, then brought an action to recover the settlement funds from the mortgagor. The District Court had concluded that the plaintiff's claim was groundless, but also ruled "seemingly as an after-thought" that "the servicer was not a real party in interest" and thus dismissed the suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). Judge Posner reversed the District Court, finding that the servicer was a real party in interest.

The opinion first explained how mortgages are placed in a securitization trust and that the "trustee or in this case the trustee's delegate (the plaintiff)" is responsible for servicing those mortgages. Servicers are necessary entities because of the need for neutral parties to "balance impartially the interests of the different tranches as determined by their contractual entitlements."

The opinion then distinguished the power of attorneys versus the power of assignees to collect debts. An attorney cannot bring an action in his or her own name on behalf of a real party in interest simply by disclosing that client's identity. However, the servicer is "much like an assignee for collection." In this case, the servicer had standing to sue because it had a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit as "it receives a percentage of the proceeds of a defaulted loan that it services."

Judge Posner concluded that under the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement, the servicer "has the whip hand; he is the lawyer and the client"; while the trustee's duty was merely to provide support when needed. The pooling and servicing agreement delegated equitable ownership of the claim to the servicer, while the trust holds mere bare legal title.

This opinion is significant because it strongly validates the loan servicer as the real party in interest in collections actions by focusing on the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement. Pooling and servicing agreements give almost plenary power to servicers to administer and enforce the terms of the subject mortgage loans. This opinion should be cited by creditors to counter the real party in interest defense in order to resolve the default, whether through loss mitigation or court action.

Wednesday, June 30, 2010

3rd Circuit

The Third Circuit correctly overruled the 1984 Frenville holding that a claim ‘arises’ for bankruptcy purposes when a ‘right to payment’ accrues under applicable non-bankruptcy law as too narrow of an interpretation of “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In re Grossman’s, Inc., (3rd Cir. 6/2/10)

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

In Re Noesk

In the now infamous In re Nosek action, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that a sanction imposed under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 against the mortgage loan servicer in the amount of $250,000 was unreasonable where the mortgage loan servicer incorrectly stated in a filing that it was the holder of the note.


Ameriquest originated a loan to the borrower in this action, which it then assigned to an asset securitization trust for which Norwest Bank acted as trustee. When the borrower defaulted, Norwest filed a foreclosure action that was eventually stayed by the borrower’s bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy action, Ameriquest filed a proof of claim in its own name and moved for relief from the stay. Ameriquest’s motion incorrectly stated that it was the “holder of the first mortgage” on the debtor’s property when, in fact, Norwest was the holder.

When the mistake was revealed by a later filing, the bankruptcy court, sua sponte, imposed a fine of $650,000 in Rule 9011 sanctions against Ameriquest, Norwest and Ameriquest’s counsel. Ameriquest appealed to challenge the $250,000 in sanctions that were assessed against Ameriquest individually.

Ameriquest admitted that it violated Rule 9011 but contended that the sanctions were unreasonable. The First Circuit agreed with Ameriquest, finding the sanctions excessive.

First, the appellate court held that, “nothing indicates that Ameriquest’s claim that it was the holder of the mortgage was a deliberate falsehood or intended in any way to mislead the court.”

In addition to being neither intentional nor self-serving, the First Circuit also held that, “the bankruptcy court has not identified any actual prejudice from the inaccurate claim.” The First Circuit determined that while the mistake by Ameriquest could have been consequential in some cases, in this matter the false statement had no effect in this case.

The First Circuit therefore reduced the $250,000 sanction to $5,000 after taking into account legal fees incurred on appeal.

In Re Angelo Divittorio 05-20854 Eastern Div MA

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Eastern Division, recently held that: (1) a debtor failed to state a claim under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (“CCCDA”) based on an alleged inaccuracy in the disclosure of an interest rate reduction feature contingent upon future timely payments; and (2) the debtor waived his CCCDA claims against a mortgage lender and its successors and assigns by signing and subsequently defaulting on a loan modification agreement which included specific waiver language.

After a debtor filed his Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, the mortgage loan on his primary residence became the subject of a significant amount of litigation. The debtor first opposed the loan servicer’s motion for relief from stay, and the parties eventually entered a modification agreement as to the loan. The modification agreement included a release provision pursuant to which the debtor agreed that by executing the modification he "irrevocably waived and relinquished" any claims of any kind related to the loan documents in existence at the time of the modification, whether known or not known, against all prior and subsequent parties or predecessors in interest to both the loan servicer and the loan investor.


The debtor redefaulted by falling behind on his modified payments. He then sent a notice of rescission and shortly thereafter filed the instant adversary action against the loan investor for rescission of the mortgage loan under the CCCDA. The debtor sought rescission of the loan in part on the grounds that the APR disclosure provided at the closing of the loan was inaccurate because it was calculated presuming the borrower would eventually qualify for an interest rate reduction feature that would kick in only after the debtor made twenty-two timely payments, that this presumption was not clearly and conspicuously disclosed, and that the presumption was not statistically likely to come about. The bankruptcy court granted the investor’s motion to dismiss the adversary claim. The debtor appealed and the district court remanded the matter back to the bankruptcy court for reconsideration.

On remand, the investor filed a motion for summary judgment to be consolidated with its prior motion to dismiss. The investor argued in its summary judgment motion that (1) the debtor should be judicially estopped from asserting any loan origination claims because he failed to assert those claims earlier in his bankruptcy schedules; and (2) that the debtor waived his claims against the investor through the release provision of the modification agreement. This opinion followed.

The bankruptcy court first addressed the motion to dismiss, finding that the FRB's Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z is silent as to whether a lender can factor an assumption of timely payments into an APR calculation at the time of assumption and ultimately holding that the debtor failed to state a claim under the CCCDA because the TIL disclosure was “based upon what the regulations required,” and the debtor was wrongfully attempting to re-characterize a time-barred predatory lending claim as a rescission claim in recoupment under the CCCDA.

The court next looked to the judicial estoppel claim made by the investor in its motion for summary judgment, finding that the investor “failed to satisfy one of the mandatory conditions …of judicial estoppel,” namely, that the party “succeeded in the prior proceeding.” In this matter no relief, such as a discharge, had been granted in the prior proceeding, such that application of judicial estoppel was not appropriate.

The bankruptcy court did, however, rule that the debtor had waived his CCCDA claim through his execution of the loan modification agreement. The bankruptcy court agreed with the investor’s contention that the waiver provision under TILA, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(e)(1), which provides that a consumer may waive his or her right to rescind if the extension of credit is a bona fide personal financial emergency, applies only to the initial three-day rescission period and does not any extended period arising from the failure to provide material disclosures.

Further, the bankruptcy court found that, contrary to the debtor’s assertions, it is possible to waive the right of rescission after the expiration of the initial rescission period but before the underlying claim is raised. The bankruptcy court reviewed the few cases on this issue and disagreed with those cases that applied a hyper-technical standard with respect to TILA violations, which has been rejected by the First Circuit. The bankruptcy court applied the First Circuit’s “totality of circumstances” approach to determining the validity of waivers as "knowing and voluntary," ultimately finding that in this matter the debtor’s “possession of the loan documents put him on inquiry notice of his purported CCCDA claims.” The bankruptcy court also found that the language in the release at issue referencing claims arising in connection with the “making, closing, administration collection, or the enforcement … of the loan documents,” was clear and conspicuous and should have compelled the debtor, who was notably represented by counsel, to investigate the possibilities of such claims.

SUPREME COURT TO HEAR CHASE’S APPEAL IN CREDIT CARD CASE


The Supreme Court, taking on a case affecting the rights of credit card customers, agreed yesterday to settle banks’ duty to give advance notice before raising the interest rate they will charge when a card user defaults on a payment, according to a SCOTUS Blog analysis. The Court granted certiorari despite the advice of the federal government that the case should be returned to lower courts to consider the Federal Reserve’s views. The government suggested that the case had little continuing importance, but bank card-issuers disagreed. A series of lawsuits, aimed at perhaps half of the entire credit card industry, followed a Ninth Circuit ruling that a customer had to be notified in advance if a card issuer was going to raise a rate due to delinquency or default — even though the contract with the issuer already had indicated that such a change would follow. Chase Bank USA (now a part of JPMorgan Chase & Co.) took the case on to the Supreme Court, saying that it was already clear that the Federal Reserve did not require any such notice. (In 2009, the Fed, later backed by a new law from Congress, imposed a 45-day advance notice requirement before implementing a default rate increase, but that only applies to increases that would go into effect after last August, and not the ones at issue in Chase Bank USA v. McCoy, et al., 09-329.) The case will be heard and decided in the term starting Oct. 4.

http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/credit-card-holders-rights/

U.S. REPORTS FEWER ENROLLEES, MORE DROPOUTS FROM FEDERAL MORTGAGE RELIEF PROGRAM

The Obama administration's marquee foreclosure-prevention initiative continues to struggle, as government data released yesterday shows that fewer homeowners are enrolling in the program and more are losing their federal mortgage aid, the Washington Post reported today. Lenders enrolled homeowners into the mortgage relief effort, known as Making Home Affordable, at a slower pace last month after federal officials tightened the qualification process. Since the program's launch last year, nearly 340,000 homeowners have received a permanent loan modification that lowers their mortgage payment for five years. However, a growing number of borrowers are failing to move from the program's initial stage into a permanent loan modification. Lenders have said that many homeowners are failing to make the reduced loan payments and others have not been able to prove they qualify for mortgage assistance. The number of borrowers dropped from the program, about 436,000, eclipses those who have been helped, according to Treasury Department data. More than 100,000 borrowers lost their mortgage aid in May.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/21/AR2010062104705_pf.html